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ABSTRACT

Dagosta, Joseph William. M.S. Department of Psychology, Wright State University,
2017. I Saw Something, Do I Say Something? The Role of the Organization, Supervisor,
and Coworkers in Encouraging Workers to Peer Report Others’ Counterproductive Work
Behavior.

Counterproductive work behaviors (CWBs) harm organizations and their members
(Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Niehoff & Paul, 2000). CWBs, however, often go unnoticed
by management. Peer reporting, which refers to employees notifying organizational
authorities of their peers’ CWBs, can help the organization detect CWBs. Employees,
however, are generally hesitant to peer report (Bowling & Lyons, 2015; Treviño &
Victor, 1992). The purpose of the current study was to investigate the mechanisms by
which the organization, supervisor, and the workgroup might each facilitate employees’
peer reporting of CWBs. Drawing from situational strength theory, I argue that the
organizational peer reporting policies, supervisors’ encouragement to peer report, and
workgroup norms regarding peer reporting each create a “strong” peer reporting situation
in which employees are more likely to peer report. Furthermore, I argue that
commitment to the organization, supervisor, and workgroup moderates the respective
relationships of organizational policies, supervisors’ encouragement, and workgroup
norms with employees’ peer reporting of CWBs. Using a sample of workers from
iii

Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk; N = 450), I found that organizational commitment
moderates the relationship between organizational peer reporting policies and peer
reporting of CWBs targeted at the organization. My findings have important practical
and theoretical implications for the peer reporting literature.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Counterproductive work behaviors (CWBs) are voluntary employee behaviors
that harm the organization and can lead to significant performance and monetary losses
(Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Niehoff & Paul, 2000). Workers, however, often commit
CWBs covertly, thereby making it difficult for management to detect such behavior and
thus causing further harm to the organization (Berry, Carpenter, & Barrett, 2012). The
difficulty in CWB detection has prompted researchers to investigate the causes of peer
reporting, a behavior that may facilitate the detection of CWBs (Treviño & Victor, 1992).
Peer reporting occurs when employees notifying organizational authorities (e.g.,
supervisors or representatives of the human resources department) of their peers’ CWBs
(Treviño & Victor, 1992).
Prior research has demonstrated that employees are generally hesitant to peer
report; thus it is important to investigate the ways in which organizations can facilitate
employees’ peer reporting behavior (Bowling & Lyons, 2015; Curphy et al., 1998;
Treviño & Victor, 1992). Researchers, unfortunately, have typically used hypothetical
scenarios instead of actual work settings to study peer reporting (e.g., Curphy et al., 1998;
Treviño & Victor, 1992; Study 2) and have not examined the mechanisms by which the
organization, supervisor, and workgroup facilitate employees’ peer reporting behavior.
Drawing from situational strength theory (Meyer, Dalal, & Hermida, 2010; Mischel,
1977, I argue that the organization and its constituencies (i.e., supervisors and
1

workgroups) may behave in ways that either encourage or discourage peer reporting of
CWBs. More specifically, organizational policies regarding peer reporting, supervisors’
encouragement to peer report, and workgroup norms regarding peer reporting might each
create a strong “peer reporting situation” in which peer reporting is more likely to occur.
Furthermore, following Mowday, Steers, and Porter’s (1979) conceptualization of
work commitment, the effects of commitment to the organization, to one’s supervisor,
and one’s work group might further facilitate peer reporting of CWBs. Thus, the purpose
of my study is to (a) examine the main effects of organizational peer reporting policies,
supervisors’ encouragement to peer report, and workgroup norms regarding peer
reporting on workers’ peer reporting of CWBs, and (b) examine how commitment to the
organization, supervisor, and workgroup might moderate these effects. In the next
subsection, I briefly review the CWB literature. I then provide a detailed review of the
peer reporting literature.
Summary of the CWB Literature
Counterproductive work behaviors (CWBs) include a variety of employee
behaviors that result in harm to the organization or its members (Bennett & Robinson,
2000; Spector & Fox, 2005; Spector, Fox, Penney, Bruursema, Goh, & Kessler, 2006).
Examples of CWBs include theft of company property, arriving late to work, harassing
one’s coworkers, and sabotaging one’s own work or that of others. Prior research
regarding the causes of CWBs has found that workers with low levels of
conscientiousness, agreeableness, emotional stability, and job satisfaction are more likely
to commit CWBs than are workers who are high in these variables (Berry, Ones, &
2

Sackett, 2007; Penney & Spector, 2002; Spector & Fox, 2005).
The outcomes of CWBs are negative for the organization in two primary ways:
(a) CWBs cause significant financial loss to the organization (Bennett & Robinson, 2000;
Niehoff & Paul, 2000) and (b) employees in the organization are adversely affected when
they are the target of CWBs (Ayoko, Callan, & Härtel, 2003; Meier & Spector, 2013).
Prior research, for example, indicates that CWBs cost organizations billions of dollars in
lost revenue every year (National Retail Security Survey [NRSS], 2008; Niehoff & Paul,
2000). Furthermore, employees who are the target of CWBs experience feelings of
anxiety at work, decreased well-being, and may even commit CWBs themselves (Ayoko
et al., 2003; Bowling & Beehr, 2006; Spector & Jex, 1998). However, because workers
commit many CWBs covertly with the intention of hiding their misbehavior, it is difficult
for organizations to determine when CWBs occur, which thereby thwarts organizational
efforts to prevent them (Berry et al., 2012). Peer reporting, fortunately, may allow
management to detect CWBs that would otherwise be overlooked.
Summary of Peer Reporting Literature
Distinguishing peer reporting from whistle-blowing. Before reviewing the
peer reporting literature, it is important to make a key distinction between peer reporting
and another behavior that facilitates the detection of employee misbehavior: whistleblowing. Whistle-blowing refers to an employee metaphorically “blowing the whistle”
on some activity within the organization that is interpreted as detrimental to the
organization’s external reputation (Miceli & Near, 1984). As outlined by Curphy et al.
(1998), whistle-blowing refers to employees reporting unethical acts to some external
3

party (e.g., government regulators) that can identify the legality of certain organizational
actions and then take appropriate action to punish the organization. Peer reporting, on the
other hand, refers to an employee reporting coworkers’ misbehavior to a party internal to
the organization, such as a direct supervisor. Thus, whistle-blowing and peer reporting
differ based on (a) who is harmed by the misbehavior (i.e., society vs. the organization,
respectively), (b) the perpetrator of the misbehavior (i.e., the organization as a whole vs.
individual employees), and (c) the party receiving reports of misbehavior (i.e., an external
party vs. an internal party). The key differences between peer reporting and whistleblowing are displayed in Table 1.
Prior Research on Peer Reporting
Prior research has examined many predictors of peer reporting. As I review in the
following sections, the predictor variables examined by prior peer reporting studies can
each be placed into one of the following six general categories: (a) characteristics of the
organization, (b) characteristics of the occupation, (c) characteristics of the workgroup,
(d) witness individual differences, (e) witness job attitudes, and (f) characteristics of the
perpetrator. It is important to note that many studies have examined the hypothetical peer
reporting behavior of students in an academic setting (e.g., McCabe, Treviño, &
Butterfield, 2001; Mihelić & Culiberg, 2014; Treviño & Victor, 1992). These studies are
not included in my review due to my focus on organizational rather than academic
settings.
Characteristics of the organization. Prior peer reporting studies have
demonstrated that organizations can either facilitate or hinder employees’ peer reporting
4

behavior. King and Hermodson (2000) surveyed registered nurses on their peer reporting
of unethical acts committed by their colleagues. Their results suggested that ambiguous
feedback from the organization on appropriate behaviors to report was associated with
less peer reporting. Similar research in the medical field has also found that a
bureaucratic structure may exhaust potential peer reporters, which prevents employees
from peer reporting (Orbe & King, 2000).
Additionally, prior studies in the peer reporting literature have demonstrated that
the organizations’ holding its employees accountable for peer reporting, and in turn,
organization-wide “following through” on ethics policies are likely to facilitate
employees’ peer reporting behavior (Hor, Iedema, Williams, White, Kennedy, & Day,
2010; Treviño & Weaver, 2001). Thus, although organizations can facilitate their
employees’ peer reporting behavior by enacting and enforcing ethics policies,
organizations can also hinder peer reporting through unclear feedback regarding which
behaviors should be reported and bureaucratic structures that make it difficult for issues
to be addressed.
Characteristics of the occupation. Prior peer reporting studies have
demonstrated that occupational differences can affect employees’ peer reporting
behavior. Many of these prior studies have used samples from occupations with strict
honor codes. King and Hermodson (2000), for example, surveyed registered nurses on
their peer reporting of unethical acts and found that most nurses reported ethical issues
because of the strict honor code the nurses had accepted when entering their occupation.
Similarly, Orbe and King (2010) found that upholding the ideals of the medical
5

profession was a common reason for medical professionals’ peer reporting behavior.
This suggests that one’s occupation can hold workers responsible for peer reporting
misbehavior even when their organization does not.
Prior research has also examined peer reporting within the military, another work
setting with strict honor codes. Curphy et al. (1998), for example, found that most United
States Air Force Academy cadets were likely to report honor code violations. Ellis and
Arieli (1999), however, found that despite the strong, formal military system in the Israeli
Defense Forces (IDF), actual reporting of illegal activity was relatively rare because of
the organizational culture common in turbulent military units (i.e., peer reporting impedes
efficiency of organizational goals).
Characteristics of the workgroup. Prior research has identified several
mechanisms by which workgroups either facilitate or hinder their members’ peer
reporting behavior. Treviño and Victor (1992), for example, found that when peer
reporting was defined as a role responsibility of group members in a fast-food scenario,
group members were more likely to report coworker theft. Therefore, social systems
within workgroups can exert pressures that make peer reporting either a proscribed or
discouraged behavior. De Graaf (2010), on the other hand, posited that workers have to
balance their workgroup loyalty with a sense of justice for peer reporting. An exploration
of archives from integrity bureaus revealed that the fear of consequences for violating
workgroup loyalty was associated with less peer reporting of integrity violations. Thus,
whereas the role responsibility to peer report facilitates the peer reporting behavior of
workgroups, the perception that peer reporting violates workgroup loyalty often prevents
6

workers from peer reporting.
Witness individual differences. Research examining the effects of individual
differences on peer reporting behavior has found mixed support. Gruys, Stewart, and
Bowling (2010), for example, examined the effects of locus of control on the reporting of
coworkers’ drug and alcohol use at work. Their results demonstrated that internal work
locus of control was negatively associated with peer reporting behavior in one of three
occupational samples. Bowling and Lyons (2015), on the other hand, examined the
effects of extraversion, emotional stability, conscientiousness, and agreeableness on the
relationship between observing and reporting CWBs. Those traits, however, failed to
significantly predict the reporting of CWBs. Perhaps witness individual differences may
not affect peer reporting behavior due to their relatively distal relationship with peer
reporting.
Witness job attitudes. Whereas previous research in the peer reporting literature
investigating witness individual differences has found mixed results, effects for witness
job attitudes have been more consistent. Research, for example, has found that attitudes
toward revenge are negatively associated with peer reporting of coworkers’ alcohol and
drug use (Gruys et al., 2010). Similarly, Bowling and Lyons (2015) found that
organizational commitment was positively related to peer reporting.
Treviño and Weaver (2001) similarly found that employees’ perceptions of
general organizational justice were positively related to peer reporting behavior. Finally,
prior research has demonstrated that the fear of consequences from the organization for
the peer reporting of integrity violations in the workplace is a common reason for not
7

peer reporting (De Graaf, 2010). Therefore, when employees hold positive attitudes
toward their job or organizations, they are more likely to peer report the misbehavior they
witness because they know that the organization will act in response to their peer
reporting behavior. However, other witness job attitudes, such as the fear of
consequences from the organization, prevent employees from peer reporting because the
organization’s response to peer reporting behavior is undetermined or perceived as
negative.
Characteristics of the perpetrator. Finally, prior research has suggested that
characteristics of CWB perpetrators can impact witnesses’ peer reporting behavior.
Curphy et al. (1998), for example, investigated the effects of a potential reporter’s
emotional closeness to the perpetrator on the witnesses’ peer reporting of honor code
violations. The results indicated that emotional closeness predicted the intention to peer
report, but this was not the case when the misconduct was perceived as very severe. This
suggests that the severity of egregious forms of misbehavior can trump the positive
attitudes a witness may hold toward a perpetrator.
Additional research suggests that the perceived similarity between witnesses and
perpetrators significantly affects the witnesses’ subsequent behavior (Miller & Thomas,
2005; Schmidtke, 2007). More specifically, witnesses are less likely to report
misbehavior (a) when the social norm consensus regarding theft from the workplace is
low, and (b) the perpetrator is perceived to be similar to the witness (Schmidtke, 2007).
Schmidtke (2007) posits that having social norms regarding misbehavior communicates
to workers that such misbehavior is acceptable and occurs without consequence.
8

Furthermore, workers often look to their coworkers as a guide for work-related behavior.
Thus, witnessing coworkers commit misbehavior might make workers less likely to
report and more likely to mimic such misbehavior. Lastly, when employees have a close
relationship with their supervisors and team members are the perpetrators, employees are
far less likely to report any wrongdoing than when the employees do not have a close
relationship with the perpetrators (Miller & Thomas, 2005). In sum, these findings
suggest that the emotional closeness between witnesses and perpetrators as well as a
witness’s perceived similarity to a perpetrator both prevent workers from peer reporting.
Limitations of Prior Research on Peer Reporting
Much of the research in the peer reporting literature has three notable limitations:
(a) the reliance on hypothetical scenario studies, (b) the failure to control for the number
of CWBs observed, and (c) the failure to simultaneously consider multiple forms of
CWB. I discuss each of these below.
Reliance on Hypothetical Scenarios. Much of the prior research on peer
reporting has used hypothetical work scenarios (e.g., Curphy et al., 1998; King, 2001;
Treviño & Victor, 1992; Study 2), which have consequences for the generalizability of
their findings. In these studies, participants are presented with a hypothetical work
scenario in which a coworker has committed some form of misbehavior and the
participant is asked how he or she would respond. Treviño and Victor (1992), for
example, examined peer reporting behavior in two scenarios: an academic scenario and a
fast-food scenario.
Although prior studies using hypothetical work scenarios intended to measure
9

workers’ likelihood to peer report, the generalizability of these findings must be
questioned because participants are generally incapable of predicting and anticipating
their own behavior (Diekmann, 2008; Sherman, 1980). Workers, for example, may be
more likely to engage in impression management in studies using hypothetical work
scenarios (Bowling & Lyons, 2015; Sherman, 1980). Thus, in regards to peer reporting
CWBs, workers may not accurately estimate their likelihood to peer report, thereby
threatening the generalizability of such results to workers in actual work settings.
Failure to Control for Number of CWB Observed. A second limitation is that
previous studies have generally not controlled for the total number of CWBs witnesses
have observed. It is unlikely that workers report every CWB they witness (see Bowling
& Lyons, 2015). Therefore, workers who witness the greatest amounts of coworker
CWBs have the greatest opportunities to engage in peer reporting. Thus, given the
varying rates of CWBs in different workplaces, it is necessary to control for the number
of CWBs workers observe. In the current study, I will control for the total number of
CWBs observed.
Failure to Simultaneously Consider Multiple Forms of CWB. Finally, prior
peer reporting research has generally focused on a single form of CWBs rather than on
CWBs in general (e.g., Gruys et al., 2010; Victor et al., 1993). Gruys et al. (2010), for
instance, focused specifically on alcohol and drug use in the workplace, whereas Victor
et al. (1993) focused on employee theft. The current study, however, will investigate a
broader range of CWBs—those identified by Bennett and Robinson (2000)—which
allows the current research to generalize across multiple types of CWB.
10

The Current Study
In the current study, I used situational strength theory as the theoretical basis for
examining the effects of organizations, supervisors, and workgroups on the peer reporting
of CWBs. According to situational strength theory, situations vary from each other in
how strong they are (Mischel, 1973). Meyer, Dalal, and Hermida (2010) posited that
there are four facets to situational strength theory: (a) clarity, (b) consequences, (c)
consistency, and (d) constraints. Clarity refers to the extent to which cues regarding
responsibilities are available and easily understood. A situation with high clarity, for
example, might refer to official, organizational policies informing employees of their
responsibilities or strong organizational norms influencing employee behavior. The
consequences dimension of situational strength refers to the extent to which decisions or
actions have significant implications. An occupation in which job-related errors are
related to negative outcomes (e.g., brain surgeon), for example, would impose a strong
situation in which employee actions are strongly associated with significant implications
(Meyer, Dalal, & Bonaccio, 2009). Consistency refers to the extent to which cues
regarding responsibilities are compatible with each other. Maintaining consistency
between the content of organizational policies regarding a particular behavior and the
content of supervisors’ orders, for example, is expected to strengthen a given situation.
Finally, the constraints facet refers to the extent to which individual’s decision making is
limited by external forces. Withey, Gellatly, and Annett (2005), for example,
demonstrated that the transferability of skills and job market favorability (i.e.,
conceptualizations of the constraints facet) predicted employee behavior to a greater
11

extent than did personality variables.
In the current study, I posit that workers’ general hesitancies to peer report can be
counteracted by strong peer reporting situations created by either the organization,
supervisor, or workgroup. The organization, supervisor, and workgroup might each
behave in ways that create strong peer reporting situations in which workers are
encouraged to peer report their coworkers’ CWBs. More specifically, the presence of
organizational peer reporting policies, supervisors’ encouragement to peer report, and
workgroup norms regarding peer reporting might each create strong situations in which
peer reporting is more likely to occur.
I will also examine the moderating effects of commitment to the organization,
supervisor, and workgroup on the relationships that the organization, supervisor, and
workgroup each respectively have on workers’ peer reporting behavior. These
hypothesized moderator effects are based on the idea that people are more compliant with
sources of influence that they are personally committed to (Lavelle, Rupp, & Brockner,
2007; Morin et al., 2011). In the following sections I first discuss the effects of the
organization, supervisor, and workgroup on peer reporting behavior and present my first
hypotheses. I then discuss commitment as a hypothesized moderator of these effects.
Organizational peer reporting policies. Although prior research has
investigated the effects of the organization on workers’ peer reporting behavior, few
studies have investigated the effects of official, organizational policies regarding peer
reporting (for an exception, see Lyons, Bowling, Gibson, & Zimmerlin, 2015).
Examining organizational peer reporting policies as a predictor of peer reporting of
12

CWBs is important because such research could help inform the content of such policies.
Drawing from situational strength theory, organizational policies regarding peer reporting
might strengthen the peer reporting situation in two ways: (a) responsibilities regarding
peer reporting are clarified, and (b) consequences are associated with peer reporting or
failing to peer report. Furthermore, organizational policies might counteract workers’
hesitancy to report (see Bowling & Lyons, 2015; Curphy et al., 1998; Treviño & Victor,
1992). Therefore, the presence of official organizational policies should facilitate peer
reporting by creating a strong situation in which peer reporting of CWB-Os is
encouraged.
Hypothesis 1: The presence of an organizational peer reporting policy is
positively associated with peer reporting of counterproductive work behaviors.
Supervisors’ encouragement to peer report. Although prior research has
established many predictors of peer reporting, it has not investigated the effects of
supervisor behavior on subordinates’ peer reporting behavior. It is important to examine
the effects of supervisors on their subordinates’ peer reporting behavior because, in
addition to the organization, supervisors use many formal influence tactics (e.g., reward
and coercive power, legitimate power, and expert power) to encourage their subordinates
to behave in certain ways (French & Raven, 1959). Furthermore, subordinates are
unlikely to go against their supervisors’ directions because such behavior may result in
role conflict and incompatible expectations (Chonko & Burnett, 1983; Kahn, Wolfe,
Quinn, Snoek, & Rosenthan, 1964). Given that supervisors have a certain level of control
over their subordinates, supervisors likely influence their subordinates’ peer reporting
13

behavior.
Due to their powerful influence over subordinates, supervisors might be able to
create strong peer reporting situations in which their subordinates are more likely to peer
report CWBs that specifically harm their supervisors. Although supervisors might not
enact official peer reporting policies to the same extent that organizations enact official
peer reporting policies, supervisors might informally encourage their subordinates to peer
report in ways that are aligned with organizational peer reporting policies. Drawing from
situational strength theory, supervisors’ encouragement to peer report might create strong
peer reporting situations by (a) clarifying their subordinates’ responsibilities regarding
peer reporting, (b) associating consequences with peer reporting or failing to peer report,
and (c) remaining consistent in their subordinates’ responsibilities regarding peer
reporting. Thus, according to situational strength theory (Mischel, 1973) and the many
ways supervisors exert control over their subordinates, supervisors might encourage their
subordinates to peer report CWBs directed at supervisors by creating strong peer
reporting situations.
Hypothesis 2: The extent to which one’s supervisor encourages peer reporting is
positively associated with peer reporting behavior of counterproductive work
behaviors.
Workgroup norms regarding peer reporting. Prior research in the peer
reporting literature has examined the effects that workgroups have on group members’
peer reporting of ethical violations and workplace theft (e.g., De Graaf, 2010; Treviño &
Victor, 1992). However, researchers have not specifically examined the effects of
14

workgroup norms regarding peer reporting on group members’ peer reporting of CWBs
in general. Furthermore, researchers have not used Meyer et al.’s conceptualization of
situational strength as the basis for hypotheses involving workgroup culture regarding
CWBs. Previous research in the CWB literature, on the other hand, has demonstrated
that workgroup norms affect the occurrence of CWBs (Bachrach, Bamberger, &
Sonnenstuhl, 2002; Martocchio, 1994; Sliter, Jex, & Grubb, 2013). Bachrach et al.
(2002), for example, found that permissive drinking norms in the workplace was the
strongest predictor of problem drinking among employees. Similarly, permissive norms
regarding absence from work were positively associated with employee absenteeism
(Martocchio, 1994). Therefore, norms regarding CWBs in the workplace can have strong
effects over employees’ perceptions of acceptable behavior in the workplace. The degree
to which members of a work group perceive CWBs as being acceptable may, in turn,
influence whether those members believe that the occurrence of CWBs ought to be
reported to organizational authorities.
Furthermore, prior research has demonstrated that workgroups create norms that
are independent of those of the organization and which influence group member behavior
to a greater extent than does the organization (Barker, 1993). Workgroups also
informally control group member deviant behavior in a manner that often renders
organizational rules for deviant behavior ineffective (Hollinger & Clark, 1982).
Therefore, workgroups play an important role in group member behavior, perhaps to a
greater extent than does the organization. Due to this level of influence over group
members, workgroups might create strong peer reporting situations through norms
15

regarding peer reporting behavior. More specifically, workgroup norms regarding peer
reporting might facilitate group members’ peer reporting behavior by (a) clarifying peer
reporting as an acceptable group member behavior, (b) associating consequences with
peer reporting or failing to peer report, and (c) remaining consistent in the acceptability
of peer reporting behavior. Thus, workgroup norms regarding peer reporting might
create strong peer reporting situations in which group members’ peer reporting behavior
is more likely to occur.
Hypothesis 3: The extent to which one perceives their workgroup as holding
positive norms regarding peer reporting is positively associated with higher peer
reporting behavior of counterproductive behaviors.
Work commitment. Although the organization, supervisor, and workgroup might create
strong situations in which workers are more likely to peer report CWBs, some workers in
these situations might be more willing to peer report than others. More specifically,
workers who are committed might be more willing to help their organization, supervisor,
and workgroup by peer reporting the CWBs they witness. Thus, commitment to the
organization, supervisor, and workgroup might further facilitate workers’ peer reporting
behavior. I discuss each of these effects below. First, however, I briefly review the
relevant work commitment literature.
Mowday, Steers, and Porter (1979) defined organizational commitment as the
extent to which employees have an active relationship with their employing organization
such that they are willing to contribute a significant amount of their own resources to the
organization. Mowday et al. further posited that organizational commitment is
16

characterized by three related factors: (a) employees have a strong desire to stay with
their organization, (b) employees share and accept the organization’s goals and values,
and (c) employees are willing to exert considerable effort to benefit the organization.
Prior research has demonstrated that Mowday et al.’s conceptualization provides a
reliable theoretical framework for investigating the effects of organizational commitment
on many organizational outcomes (O’Reilly & Chatman, 1986; Porter, Steers, &
Mowday, 1974; Steers, 1977). Porter et al. (1974), for example, found that high levels of
organizational commitment were associated with low levels of turnover and high levels
of job satisfaction. Porter et al. suggested that employees with high levels of
commitment will place a high value on the goals of the organization, which outweighs
the effects of liking or disliking the present tasks. Furthermore, Steers (1977) found that
organizational commitment was positively related to the intent and desire to remain with
the organization.
Commitment dimensions. Following Mowday et al.’s (1979) conceptualization of
organizational commitment, Meyer and Allen (1991, 1997) provided support for a three
component model of organizational commitment: affective, continuance, and normative.
Affective commitment refers to employees’ attachment to the employing organization.
Employees with high levels of affective commitment stay with the organization because
they have a desire to do so. Continuance commitment refers to employees’ maintaining
their employment with their organization because of a lack of alternative job
opportunities. Employees with high levels of continuance commitment remain with their
organization because they must. Normative commitment refers to employees’ feelings of
17

obligation towards the employing organization. Employees with high levels of normative
commitment stay with their organization because they feel obligated to do so. Prior
research, however, has found that affective commitment is generally more predictive of
organizational variables than are the other two dimensions of commitment (Becker, 1992;
Vandenberghe et al., 2004). Therefore, I will measure affective commitment to the
organization, supervisor, and workgroup in the current study rather than measure all three
components of commitment.
Commitment foci. Previous research has demonstrated that there are many types
of commitment directed at different subgroups or foci within the organization (Becker,
1992; Reichers, 1985). Reichers (1985) proposed that the conceptualization of
organizational commitment as a global, encompassing concept was deficient in
explaining many organizational outcomes. A multiple commitments perspective may be
more meaningful because of the different commitments employees have to the goals and
values of many groups to which they belong. The workplace consists of several
constituencies, each of which contains its own set of values and goals that may be in
conflict or exist separately from those of other constituencies. It then follows that
organizational members are committed, to different extents, to many sets of goals and
values. Furthermore, the organization is a broad abstraction for most employees, due in
part to the many constituencies that make up the organization. Becker (1992) provided
support for the multiple foci model of commitment by demonstrating that employee
commitment in the workplace is multidimensional, thereby making organizational
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commitment insufficient in explaining employees’ commitment in the workplace.
Following the multiple foci model of commitment, previous research has shown
that commitment to the organization, supervisor, and workgroup are related to different
antecedents and outcomes. Vandenberghe et al. (2004), for example, demonstrated that
affective commitment to the organization, the supervisor, and the work group represented
distinct factors and that each related differentially to their theorized antecedents.
Therefore, organizational commitment, commitment to the supervisor, and commitment
to the workgroup might be distinctly related to workers’ peer reporting behavior.
Furthermore, Morin et al. (2011) found that affective commitment to the organization and
to coworkers were uniquely related to different organizational citizenship behaviors
(OCBs), which suggests that the multiple foci model of commitment includes
commitment to more local constituencies, such as coworkers and workgroups.
Mowday et al.’s (1979)’s conceptualization of organizational commitment can be
used to explain the potential moderating effects of commitment on the relationship
between factors that encourage peer reporting (i.e., organizational policies, supervisor
encouragement, and workgroup norms) and peer reporting behavior. Following Mowday
et al.’s (1979) conceptualization of commitment, committed workers are likely to do what
they are told regarding peer reporting for three reasons. First, committed workers are
likely to behave in a way that aligns with the wishes of the given constituency because
they hope to avoid damaging a relationship that they intend to maintain over a long
period of time. Second, committed workers share the same values as the constituency.
Thus, when the organization, supervisor, or workgroup values peer reporting (or devalues
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peer reporting), committed workers will be more likely to value peer reporting (or
devalue peer reporting). Third, despite the risk associated with peer reporting, committed
workers might be willing to exert the effort to peer report in order to benefit the
organization, supervisor, or workgroup. Thus, when organizations, supervisors, or work
groups encourage peer reporting (i.e., peer reporting is valued), highly committed
workers will be more likely to peer report CWBs than will poorly committed workers.
Hypothesis 4: The presence of an organizational peer reporting policy is more
likely to be positively associated with peer reporting behavior among workers
high in organizational commitment than among workers low in organizational
commitment.
Hypothesis 5: The extent to which one’s supervisor encourages peer reporting is
more likely to be positively associated with peer reporting behavior among
workers high in commitment to the supervisor than among workers low in
commitment to the supervisor.
Hypothesis 6: The extent to which one perceives their workgroup to hold positive
norms regarding peer reporting is more likely to be positively associated with
higher peer reporting behavior among workers high in commitment to the
workgroup than among workers low in commitment to the workgroup.
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II.

METHOD

Pilot Study
Participants. I conducted a pilot study in which seven different scales were
constructed and tested before being used in my primary study. Items for each scale were
piloted using employed undergraduate students from a large Midwestern university. The
participants were presented with a cover letter describing the purpose of the pilot study
(see Appendix A). The employed undergraduate students (N = 118, 62% women, 58%
White) were recruited using SONA, the university’s research participation platform.
Most of the participants were employed in an non-managerial role (93% non-managerial),
were employed on a part-time basis (93% part-time, !"#$%& = 21 hours, '("#$%& = 8.21
hours), and had an average tenure of about one year (!)*+$%* = 1.15 years, '()*+$%* =
1.02 years).
Creating the supervisors’ encouragement to peer report, workgroup norms
regarding peer reporting, occupational norms regarding peer reporting, and
workgroup discussion of CWBs scales. I created four new scales for the current study:
(a) supervisors’ encouragement to peer report, (b) workgroup norms regarding peer
reporting, (c) occupational norms regarding peer reporting, and (d) workgroup discussion
of CWBs. I wrote these items to measure the influence of the supervisor, workgroup, and
occupation on workers’ peer reporting of CWBs. These scales are not adaptations of
previous scales. I describe the procedures I used for writing these items in the following
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paragraphs. Given the effects of the occupation on workers’ peer reporting behavior
(Curphy et al., 1998; King & Hermodson, 2000; Orbe & King, 2010), occupational norms
regarding peer reporting will be used as a control variable in the primary study.
I constructed the items by first referring to the constituency of interest using
variations of an item stem. For the supervisors’ encouragement scale, each item began
with the stem “my supervisor.” The workgroup norms scale generally began with
“members of my workgroup,” and the occupational norms scale with “people who work
in my career field.” The exception to the item stem pattern occurred with the workgroup
discussion of CWBs scale. I wrote items for each scale such that the items were as
parallel as possible between scales. On the supervisors’ encouragement scale, I
specifically asked participants about the extent to which supervisors encourage them to
peer report and the content of such encouragement. Sample items include “my supervisor
encourages me to report any co-worker misbehavior that I witness,” and “my supervisor
encourages his/her subordinates to report any co-worker misbehavior.” On the
workgroup norms scale, I asked participants about the behaviors and attitudes their
workgroups have regarding peer reporting. Sample items include “members of my
workgroup encourage me to report any co-worker misbehavior that I witness,” and “my
workgroup encourages its members to report co-worker misbehavior.” On the
occupational norms scale, I asked participants about the perceived and actual
expectations their occupations have regarding peer reporting. Sample items include “the
norms of my career field encourage me to report any co-worker behavior that I witness,”
and “people who work in my career field are encouraged to report co-worker
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misbehavior.”
Finally, prior research has found many mechanisms by which workgroups might
influence the peer reporting of group members, including informal discussion that might
supplement a formal reporting procedure (De Graaf, 2010; Treviño & Victor, 1992). In
the current study, I controlled for the influence of workgroup discussion of CWBs on the
relationship between workgroup norms regarding peer reporting and peer reporting of
CWBs directed at the workgroup. On the workgroup discussion of CWBs scale, I asked
participants to think of times in which they discussed CWBs with their workgroup.
Sample items include “I often discuss co-worker misbehavior that I’ve witnessed with
members of my workgroup,” and “I am encouraged to discuss co-worker misbehavior
with my workgroup.”
Responses to each item were made on 7-point graphic rating scale from 1
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Higher average scores indicate a great extent of
encouragement to peer report, positive norms regarding peer reporting, or much
discussion of CWBs, whereas lower average scores indicate little encouragement to peer
report, negative norms regarding peer reporting, or little discussion of CWBs. The
piloted items for supervisors’ encouragement to peer report, workgroup norms regarding
peer reporting, occupational norms regarding peer reporting, and workgroup discussion
of CWBs are respectively shown in Appendices B, C, D, and E.
Following pilot testing of the items, I conducted an item analysis to examine the
item difficulty, item discrimination, and reliability coefficients for each scale. Due to the
small sample size, a factor analysis was not conducted. After examining item difficulty
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and item discrimination for the items on each scale, I removed items that yielded poor
item discrimination. Also, I removed reverse-scored items on each scale for a few
reasons. First, the reverse-scored items on each scale had lower inter-item correlations
and item-total correlations. Second, prior research has indicated that although the
justification for using reverse-scored items is the attenuation of response bias, the
inclusion of reverse-scored items actually reduces the internal consistency of the scale,
might introduce measurement error, and can cause respondent confusion or carelessness
which can further reduce scale reliability (Bradley, Royal, & Bradley, 2008; Merritt,
2012; Roszkowski & Soven, 2010; van Sonderen, Sanderman, & Coyne, 2013). The
final scales each consist of at least three items.
Creating the revised peer reporting scales. I also created two revised scales of
Bowling and Lyons’s (2015) peer reporting scale for the current study: (a) peer reporting
of CWBs directed at the organization and (b) peer reporting of CWBs directed at the
workgroup. I adapted the items from Bowling and Lyons’s (2015) scale of CWBs
observed and CWBs reported. The original Bowling and Lyons (2015) scale consists of
CWB-Os and CWB-Is. Participants are then asked whether they have observed each
behavior over the past year, and if so, whether they reported that behavior.
To measure the peer reporting of CWBs directed at the organization, the items
specifically addressing CWB-Os were separated from those addressing CWB-Is. Sample
items include “a co-worker littered the work environment,” and “a co-worker took
property from work without permission.” The scale consists of eight items. There are
three response options for each item (1 = “I have NOT witnessed this behavior in my
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workplace;” 2 = “I have witnessed this behavior in my workplace, but I did NOT report
it;” and 3 = “I have witnessed this behavior in my workplace, and I did report it.”) The
number of CWBs observed and CWBs reported were calculated for each participant.
Those participants who have not observed any CWB-Os in the past year were removed
from the analyses pertaining to the organizational hypotheses. Items are shown in
Appendix F.
It is important to note that each peer reporting subscale mentioned here has both a
CWBs observed and a CWBs reported total. For example, if a worker responds to a
particular item with response option 1 (i.e., “I have NOT witnessed this behavior in my
workplace”), then this worker has an observed “score” of zero for this item and a reported
“score” of zero as well. If for the next item the worker responds with response option 2
(i.e., “I have witnessed this behavior in my workplace, but I did NOT report it”), then this
worker has an observed score of one, but a reported score of zero. As a final example, if
the worker then responds to the next item with response option 3 (i.e., “I have witnessed
this behavior in my workplace, and I did report it”), then the worker gets an observed
score of one and a reported score of one. The observed and reported scores for all items
on each scale are then counted and summed for each participant. The final result is the
total number of observed CWBs and reported CWBs for that participant on that particular
subscale. The number of observed CWBs is used as a control variable in the current
study, whereas the number of reported CWBs is used as the outcome variable (see
Bowling & Lyons, 2015).
To measure the peer reporting of CWBs directed at the workgroup, the items from
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Bowling and Lyons’s (2015) scale specifically addressing CWB-Is were separated from
those addressing CWB-Os. Then, I rewrote each item by asking participants whether
they have witnessed such CWBs being committed against members of their workgroup.
Sample items include “a co-worker embarrassed a member of my workgroup,” and “a coworker cursed at someone in my workgroup.” The scale consists of eight items. There
are three response options for each item: (a) “I have NOT witnessed this behavior in my
workplace,” (b) “I have witnessed this behavior in my workplace, but I did NOT report
it,” and (c) “I have witnessed this behavior in my workplace, and I did report it.” The
number of CWBs observed and CWBs reported will be calculated for each participant.
Those participants who have not observed any CWBs directed at the workgroup in the
past year were removed from the analyses pertaining to the workgroup hypotheses. Items
are shown in Appendix G.
To measure the peer reporting of CWBs directed at the supervisor, I adapted items
from Mitchell and Ambrose’s (2007) scale of supervisor-directed deviance. This scale is
an adaptation of Bennett and Robinson’s (2000) CWB measure. Mitchell and Ambrose’s
(2007) scale consists of eight items, each of which asks participants whether they have
committed deviant behaviors against their supervisor. I rewrote each item by asking
participants whether they have witnessed their co-workers commit deviant behaviors
against their supervisors and whether they reported such behavior. Similar to Bowling
and Lyons’s (2015) items, each item starts with a similar stem. Sample items include “a
co-worker made fun of my supervisor at work,” and “a co-worker gossiped about my
supervisor.” The scale consists of 10 items. There are three response options for each
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item: (a) “I have NOT witnessed this behavior in my workplace,” (b) “I have witnessed
this behavior in my workplace, but I did NOT report it,” and (c) “I have witnessed this
behavior in my workplace, and I did report it.” The number of CWBs observed and
CWBs reported were calculated for each participant. Those participants who have not
observed any CWBs directed at the supervisor in the past year were removed from the
analyses pertaining to the supervisor hypotheses. Items are shown in Appendix H.
Following pilot testing of the items, I examined whether there is sufficient
variability on the measures and whether the measure correlates with the other variables
included in the pilot study. Due to the small sample size, a factor analysis was not
conducted. Rather, I conducted an item analysis to examine the item difficulty, item
discrimination, and inter-item correlations for each scale. Internal consistency reliability
coefficients were not calculated for the revised peer reporting scales (see Bowling &
Lyons, 2015). All three scales were left intact and used in the primary study.
I removed participants who have not observed CWBs (i.e., observed CWB totals
on each subscale equaled zero) because I am interested in examining whether workers
who observed CWBs reported such CWBs (see Bowling & Lyons, 2015). As previously
mentioned, observed CWBs will be counted and summed for each participant on each
subscale. CWBs that were observed and reported were counted and summed and acted
as a measure of peer reporting behavior. Observed CWBs were entered on the first step
of each hierarchical regression model to control for the total number of CWBs observed.
Primary Study
Participants. I conducted a two-tailed power analysis using G*Power to
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determine the required sample size to detect the interaction effects in my study (Faul,
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). I
conducted the analysis by setting the desired power at β = 0.80, α = 0.10, and I assumed
a small effect size of , - = 0.02. The required sample size is 444 participants. However,
due to the removal of participants who have not observed CWBs over the past year, I
recruited 500 participants in order to maintain sufficient power. My goal in the current
study was to examine the behavior of people who are witnesses of CWBs. Thus,
participants who have not observed CWBs in the last year were removed from the dataset
(see Bowling & Lyons, 2015). The current study used employed adults recruited through
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk; Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 2013). MTurk is a
crowdsourcing service that allows researchers to recruit employed survey respondents for
research projects (Landers & Behrend, 2015). I used MTurk data in the current study in
order to examine peer reporting in actual works settings. Previous research has
demonstrated that Amazon’s MTurk provides quality samples to organizational
researchers and, because of the anonymity it provides, is particularly useful for the study
of sensitive topics, such as the peer reporting of CWB (Landers & Behrend, 2015; Woo,
Keith, & Thornton, 2015). Survey respondents were compensated 50 cents for their
participation.
The participants (N = 501) were presented with a cover letter describing the
purpose of the study (see Appendix M). A majority of the participants were women and
identified as White, Non-Hispanic (55% women, 62% White). Most of the participants
were employed in an non-managerial role (71% non-managerial), were employed on a
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full-time basis (86% full-time, !"#$%& = 39.4 hours, '("#$%& = 9.71 hours), and held
post-secondary degrees (44% Bachelor’s degree holders, 15% Master’s degree holders).
A majority of participants were employed in the United States of America (84%
American employed).
Measures.
Peer reporting policies. To measure the presence of an organizational peer
reporting policy, participants were asked whether or not their organization has such a
policy. This item was used by Lyons et al. (2015). The question regarding peer reporting
policies was presented as follows: “does your organization have a policy encouraging or
requiring you to report the misbehaviors of co-workers?” Participants will be provided
with three response options (1 = Yes, 2 = No, 3 = I don’t know). I removed participants
who were unsure of their organization’s peer reporting policy.
Commitment to the organization, supervisor, and workgroup. Prior research by
Meyer and Allen (1991) has demonstrated that the best fitting model of organizational
commitment consists of three factors: affective, normative, and continuance commitment.
Affective commitment refers to workers’ emotional attachment to and level of
involvement with the organization, normative commitment refers to a feeling of
obligation to remain with the organization, and continuance commitment refers to an
awareness of the negative consequences associated with leaving the organization (Meyer
& Allen, 1997, p. 11). Stinglhamber, Bentein, and Vandenberghe’s (2002) adapted
Meyer and Allen’s (1991) scales of affective, normative, and continuance organizational
commitment to measure each of the three types of commitment to supervisors and
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workgroups. Prior research, however, has demonstrated that affective commitment to the
organization, supervisor, and workgroup show the strongest relationships with many
organizational outcomes (Meyer & Maltin, 2010; Morin et al., 2011; Stinglhamber et al.,
2002). Thus, in the current study, I used the affective organizational commitment scale
and its adaptations to other foci of commitment. Scores on each affective commitment
scale were separately calculated and averaged for each foci of commitment.
Affective organizational commitment. Affective organizational commitment was
measured using Meyer and Allen’s (1991) scale of affective organizational commitment
(α = 0.85). The scale consists of eight items, three of which are reverse-coded. Sample
items include “I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career at this organization,”
and “this organization has a great deal of personal meaning for me.” Responses to each
item are made on a 7-point graphic rating scale from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7
(“strongly agree”). Higher average scores indicate high levels of affective organizational
commitment, whereas lower average scores indicate low levels of affective
organizational commitment. Items are shown in Appendix I.
Affective commitment to the supervisor. Affective commitment to the supervisor
was measured using Stinglhamber et al.’s (2002) scale of affective commitment to the
supervisor (α = 0.88). Stinglhamber et al.’s (2002) scales of work commitment are
adaptations of Meyer and Allen’s (1991) scales of organizational commitment. The scale
consists of six items. Sample items are “I feel respect for my supervisor,” and “I feel
proud to work with my supervisor.” Responses to each item are made on a 7-point
graphic rating scale from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”). Higher average
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scores indicate high levels of affective commitment to the supervisor, whereas lower
average scores indicate low levels of affective commitment to the supervisor. Items are
shown in Appendix J.
Affective commitment to the workgroup. Affective commitment to the workgroup
was measured using Stinglhamber et al.’s (2002) scale of affective commitment to the
workgroup (α = 0.89). The scale consists of six items. Sample items are “my workgroup
means a lot to me,” and “I feel proud to be a member of this work group.” Responses to
each item are made on a 7-point graphic rating scale from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7
(“strongly agree”). Higher average scores indicate high levels of affective commitment
to the workgroup, whereas lower average scores indicate low levels of affective
commitment to the workgroup. Items are shown in Appendix K.
Affective commitment to the occupation. Affective commitment to the occupation
was measured using Stinglhamber et al.’s (2002) scale of affective commitment to the
occupation (α = 0.88). The scale consists of six items. Sample item are “my occupation
means a lot to me,” and “I am enthusiastic about my occupation.” Responses to each
item are made on a 7-point graphic rating scale from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7
(“strongly agree”). Higher average scores indicate high levels of affective commitment
to the occupation, whereas lower average scores indicate low levels of affective
commitment to the occupation. It is important to note that I am including these items in
order to run analyses unrelated to the current project. Items are shown in Appendix L.
Peer reporting. Peer reporting will be measured using Bowling and Lyons’s
(2015) scale of CWBs observed and CWBs reported. This scale is an adapted version of
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Bennett and Robinson’s (2000) CWB measure. Bowling and Lyons (2015) scale consists
of 16 items. I adapted Bowling and Lyons’s (2015) scale to separately measure the peer
reporting of CWBs that target the organization and workgroup. Mitchell and Ambrose’s
(2007) scale of CWBs directed at the supervisor was adapted to measure the peer
reporting behavior of witnesses to CWBs directed at their supervisors. The development
of these scales and piloting procedure are discussed in the pilot study section above.
Control variables.
CWBs observed. It is important to account for all CWBs that workers observe
because failing to account for differences between workers in different organizations can
act as a confounding variable on peer reporting behavior. For example, some
organizational settings are permissive of CWBs, in which case more CWBs will be
observed. In a different organizational setting, CWBs may not be tolerated, thus fewer
CWBs will be observed. Thus, I controlled for the total number of CWBs that workers
observed. Workers who indicated that they had observed at least one CWB, regardless of
whether reporting occurred, were included in the dataset; those who indicated that they
had not observed CWBs were excluded all analsyes.
Occupational norms regarding peer reporting. Prior research has demonstrated
that characteristics of the occupation can significantly affect employees’ peer reporting
behavior (Curphy et al., 1998; King & Hermodson, 2000; Orbe & King, 2010). In the
current study, I controlled for occupational characteristics by measuring occupational
norms regarding peer reporting. Occupational norms regarding peer reporting were
measured using the aforementioned scale created for the current study.
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Managerial status. It is possible that managerial status affects peer reporting
behavior. More specifically, workers in managerial positions are probably more familiar
with rules regarding CWBs and peer reporting of CWBs (Gruys et al., 2010).
Furthermore, managers might peer report more often because they might view peer
reporting as an official part of their job. Thus, managerial status (1 = non-managerial; 2
= managerial) was controlled for when testing each hypothesis (Bowling & Lyons, 2015).
Additional demographic information was collected from participants. Participants
were asked to report their gender (1 = female; 2 = male), race (1 = African American; 2 =
American Indian or Alaska Native; 3 = Asian; 4 = Hispanic; 5 = Native Hawaiian or
Pacific Islander; 6 = White, Non-Hispanic; 7 = Some other race; 8 = Two or more races),
level of education (1 = high school diploma; 2 = some college; 3 = associate’s degree; 4 =
bachelor’s degree; 5 = master’s degree; 6 = doctoral degree), status of their employment
(1 = full-time; 2 = part-time), average numbers of hours worked per week, and country of
employment (1 = United States; 2 = not United States).
Procedure
Participants completed each survey online using Qualtrics-generated surveys.
First, they were asked to read a cover letter discussing the purpose of the study and the
nature of the surveys they were administered (see Appendix M). They then indicated that
they had read the cover letter and the administration of surveys began. The measures of
organizational peer reporting policies, supervisors’ encouragement to peer report,
workgroup norms regarding peer reporting, peer reporting, and each of the commitment
scales were then administered. Following these measures, all measures of control and
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alternative variables were administered. Participants finally answered demographic
questions before completing the survey. Participants were finally thanked for their
participation in the present study, and 50 cents was deposited into their MTurk user
accounts.
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III.

RESULTS

Pilot Study
The purpose of the current pilot study was to examine the characteristics (i.e.,
item difficulty and item-total correlations) of seven new scales created for the primary
study. I created scales to measure supervisors’ encouragement to peer report, workgroup
norms regarding peer reporting, occupational norms regarding peer reporting, workgroup
discussion of CWBs, peer reporting of CWBs targeted at the organization, peer reporting
of CWBs targeted at the supervisor, and peer reporting of CWBs targeted at the
workgroup. I discuss the characteristics of each scale in the subsequent sections.
Data cleaning. I used box and whisker plots and found no outliers in the pilot
study data. Participants with missing data were removed and the remaining sample (N
=100) was used in the pilot analyses.
Supervisors’ encouragement to peer report scale. I will begin by explaining
the basic item analyses performed on each of the scales created for the pilot study before
continuing onto descriptive statistics and inter-correlations between all scales in the pilot
study. Basic item analyses were conducted in order to examine item difficulty and itemtotal correlations for each of the news scales. The item analysis results for the
supervisors’ encouragement to peer report scale are shown in Table 2. The average score
on the scale (M = 5.00) and standard deviation (SD = .88) indicate medium to high levels
of supervisor encouragement to peer report misbehaviors of co-workers (scores on each
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item potentially ranged from 1 to 7). As shown in the table, item-total correlations were
still large but generally lower for the reverse-scored items (.- = .61, ./ = .60). I removed
the reverse-scored items from this scale in order to improve scale reliability. Item 6 was
also removed due to its relatively lower item-total correlation (r = .68). The item analysis
results for the shortened scale are shown in bold in Table 2. After removing items 2, 4,
and 6, scale reliability increased to an acceptable level (α = .87).
Workgroup norms regarding peer reporting scale. I conducted similar item
analysis for the new workgroup norms measure (see Table 3). The average score on the
scale (M = 4.5) and standard deviation (SD = 1.2) indicate generally moderate norms
regarding peer reporting. As shown, item-total correlations were large but generally
lower for the reverse-scored items (.- = .77, ./ = .70). I thus removed the reverse-scored
items from this scale in order to increase scale reliability. I also removed Item 6 in order
to make the scale appear as parallel as possible to the supervisors’ encouragement scale.
The item analysis results for the shortened scale are shown in bold in Table 3 After
removing items 2, 4, and 6, scale reliability increased (α = .92).
Occupational norms regarding peer reporting scale. I also conducted item
analysis on the new occupational norms scale (see Table 4). The average score on the
scale (M = 5.00) and standard deviation (SD = 1.1) indicate slightly positive norms
regarding peer reporting. As shown, item-total correlations were generally lower for the
reverse-scored items (.- = .72, ./ = .75). I removed the reverse-scored items from this
scale in order to increase scale reliability. I also removed Item 6 in order to make the
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scale appear as parallel as possible to the other scales. The item analysis results for the
shortened scale are shown in bold in Table 4. After removing items 2, 4, and 6, scale
reliability increased (α = .91).
Workgroup discussion of CWBs scale. I conducted item analyses on the new
workgroup discussion scale (see Table 5). The average score on the scale (M = 4.00) and
standard deviation (SD = 1.00) indicates relatively average discussion of CWBs among
workgroup members. As shown in the table, item-total correlations were generally lower
for the items 4 and 7 (./ = .52, .0 = .60), which were both reverse scored items. I
removed these reverse scored items from this scale in order to increase scale reliability.
Item 2, another reverse scored item, was also removed in order to make the scale appear
as parallel as possible to the other scales. Unlike the other scales, item 6 was not dropped
because the item-total correlation (r = .78) was the strongest correlation and remained the
strongest if it were to be dropped (r = .67). The item analysis results for the shortened
scale are shown in bold in Table 5. After removing items 2, 4, and 7, scale reliability
increased to a more acceptable level (α = .83).
Construct validity of the new scales. Table 6 shows a matrix of intercorrelations between the final version of each scale in the pilot study. Internal
consistency reliabilities are displayed along the diagonal. The descriptive statistics for
each scale are also displayed. The descriptive statistics and correlations shown for
supervisors’ encouragement, workgroup norms, occupational norms, and workgroup
discussion are from the shortened versions of these scales. As described above, each peer
reporting subscale yields an “observed CWBs” score as well as a “reported CWBs” score.
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Based on prior research (see Bowling & Lyons, 2015; Gruys et al., 2010), I
predicted that (a) observed CWBs at a specific target (i.e., organization, supervisor,
workgroup) would be positively related to reported CWBs at the corresponding target, (b)
supervisors’ encouragement would be positively related to reported CWBs targeted at the
supervisor (CWB-S), (c) workgroup norms would be positively related to reported CWBs
targeted at the workgroup (CWB-W), (d) workgroup discussion of CWBs would be
positively related to reported CWBs targeted at the workgroup, and (e) occupational
norms would be positively related to reported CWBs targeted at the organization,
supervisor, and workgroup. The pattern of correlations reported in Table 6, however, is
not entirely consistent with these predictions. Each of the observed CWBs were
correlated with reported CWBs at the corresponding targets (CWB-O: r = .46, CWB-S: r
= .58, CWB-W: r = .52). However, supervisors’ encouragement to peer report was not
significantly correlated with CWB-S reported (r = -.06). Furthermore, workgroup norms
regarding peer reporting was not significantly correlated with CWB-W reported (r = .09). Workgroup discussion of CWBs was not significantly correlated with CWB-W
reported (r = .07). Occupational norms of peer reporting was not significantly correlated
with CWB observed or CWB reported scores, regardless of target. In sum, these findings
provide mixed support for the construct validity of the new scales.
Primary Study
Data cleaning. I used box and whisker plots to identify outliers (N = 11). I
conducted all tests of the study hypotheses first with the outliers included, and then again
with any outliers removed. The conclusions were similar in both analyses, therefore I
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kept the outliers in the analyses. As suggested by Tabachnick and Fiddell (2007, p. 63), I
performed a missing data analysis (MVA) in SPSS to identify missing data and observe
any patterns among the missing data. Missing data appeared to be randomly distributed
and no visible pattern was recognized. I chose not to replace missing data with mean
values, using regression, or using expectation maximization (EM) because each of these
procedures did not significantly change the means or standard deviations for the data
(Tabachnick & Fiddell, 2007, p. 71). There were no complete cases of missing data.
Therefore, participants with missing data were left in the data set for the correlation
analyses. Missing data were removed listwise, however, for all regression analyses.
In the current study, I was interested in the behavior of CWB witnesses.
Therefore, scoring for the peer reporting subscales was dependent on the number of
CWBs observed. More specifically, if participants responded that they had not observed
any CWBs targeted at the relevant body (i.e., organization, supervisor, workgroup) in the
last year, their data was excluded for the analyses pertaining to that particular subscale.
Descriptive statistics. Table 7 shows a correlation matrix of all variables in the
primary study. Internal consistency reliabilities are displayed on the diagonal. The
descriptive statistics, including mean and standard deviation, for each variable are also
displayed. Given that missing data were removed pairwise, the sample sizes for each
variable are displayed as well.
On average, participants observed more CWBs targeted at the organization
(CWB-O; M = 4.69) than CWBs targeted at the supervisor (CWB-S; M = 3.81) or CWBs
targeted at the workgroup (CWB-W; M = 3.57). On average, participants reported more
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CWB-O (M = 1.16) than CWB-S (M = 0.85) or CWB-W (M = 0.94). Furthermore,
participants reported relatively few of the CWB-W (26.33%), CWB-S (22.31%), and
CWB-O (24.97%) that they observed. These proportions of CWBs reported are
consistent with prior research (see Bowling & Lyons, 2015).
Hypothesis 1: Main Effects of Peer Reporting Policies. Hypothesis 1 posited
that the presence of organizational peer reporting policies would be positively associated
with peer reporting of CWB-O. I tested Hypothesis 1 using hierarchical regression
analysis. In Step 1, I regressed peer reporting of CWB-Os onto managerial status, CWBO observed, and occupational norms regarding peer reporting. In Step 2, I regressed peer
reporting onto the presence of a peer reporting policy. The hierarchical regression results
for the second step are shown in Table 8. Job level was a significant predictor of peer
reporting (β = .14, p < .01) as well as CWB-O observed (β = .44, p < .001).
Occupational norms was also a significant predictor of peer reporting (β = .16, p < .01).
However, the presence of an organizational peer reporting policy was not a significant
predictor of peer reporting (β = .05, p = .33). The second step of the hierarchical
regression model did not account for incremental variance in peer reporting above and
beyond the first step, 1- = .27, ∆1- = .00, F(4, 404) = .96, p = .33. Therefore, Hypothesis
1 was not supported.
Hypothesis 2: Main Effects of Supervisor Encouragement. Hypothesis 2
posited that supervisors’ encouragement to peer report would be positively associated
with peer reporting of CWBs directed at the supervisor (CWB-S). Hypothesis 2 was
tested using a hierarchical regression analysis. In Step 1, I regressed peer reporting of
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CWB-S onto managerial status, CWB-S observed, and occupational norms regarding
peer reporting. In Step 2, I regressed peer reporting of CWB-S onto supervisors’
encouragement to peer report. The hierarchical regression results for the second step are
shown in Table 9. Only CWB-S observed was a significant predictor of peer reporting (β
= .56, p < .001). Supervisors’ encouragement to peer report was not a significant
predictor of peer reporting (β = .11, p = .05). The second step of the hierarchical
regression model did not account for incremental variance in peer reporting above and
beyond the first step, 1- = .36, ∆1- = .01, F(4, 389) = 3.73, p = .05. Therefore,
Hypothesis 2 was not supported.
Hypothesis 3: Main Effects of Workgroup Norms. Hypothesis 3 posited that
workgroup norms regarding peer reporting would be positively associated with peer
reporting of CWBs directed at the workgroup (CWB-W). Hypothesis 3 was tested using
a hierarchical regression analysis. In Step 1, I regressed peer reporting of CWB-W onto
managerial status, CWB-W observed, occupational norms regarding peer reporting, and
workgroup discussion of CWBs. In Step 2, I regressed peer reporting of CWB-W onto
workgroup norms regarding peer reporting. The hierarchical regression results for the
second step are shown in Table 10. Neither job level (β = .05, p = .25) nor occupational
norms (β = .09, p = .13) were significant predictors of peer reporting. CWB-W observed
(β = .41, p < .001) and workgroup discussion (β = .11, p = .03), however, were
significant predictors of peer reporting. Workgroup norms was not a significant predictor
of peer reporting (β = .12, p = .06). The second step of the hierarchical regression model
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did not account for incremental variance in peer reporting above and beyond the first
step, 1- = .26, ∆1- = .01, F(4, 367) = 3.45, p = .06. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 was not
supported.
Hypothesis 4: Moderating Effects of Organizational Commitment.
Hypothesis 4 posited that organizational commitment would moderate the relationship
between the presence of an organizational peer reporting policy and peer reporting of
CWB-O, such that this relationship would be stronger when levels of organizational
commitment were high rather than low. Hypothesis 4 was tested using a moderated
regression analysis. For clearer interpretation, I mean-centered each of my predictor
variables and mean-centered them when calculating my interaction terms (Hofmann &
Gavin, 1998). In the first step, I regressed peer reporting of CWB-O onto managerial
status, CWB-Os observed, and occupational norms regarding peer reporting. In the
second step, I regressed peer reporting of CWB-O onto organizational peer reporting
policies and affective organizational commitment. In the third step, I regressed peer
reporting onto the organizational peer reporting policies x affective organizational
commitment interaction term. The moderated regression results for the final step are
shown in Table 11. All variables entered in the first step were significant predictors of
peer reporting, including job level (β = .12, p < .01), CWB-O observed (β = .46, p <
.001), and occupational norms (β = .12, p = .01). Similar to the analyses for Hypothesis
1, however, the presence of a peer reporting policy was not a significant predictor of peer
reporting (β = .06, p = .20). Affective organizational commitment was a significant
predictor of peer reporting (β = .18, p < .001). The interaction between peer reporting
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policies and affective organizational commitment was also significant (β = .10, p = .03).
The final step of the moderated regression model accounted for significant incremental
variance in peer reporting above and beyond the prior steps, ∆1- = .01, F(6, 402) = 4.89,
p = .03. Thus, organizational commitment significantly moderates the relationship
between peer reporting policies and peer reporting of CWB-Os.
Figure 1 shows a plot of the interaction effect between organizational peer
reporting policies and affective organizational commitment (Cohen, Cohen, West, &
Aiken, 2002; Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 2006). As shown in the figure, the presence of
a peer reporting policy had a positive relationship with peer reporting among workers
who were high in organizational commitment; however, it had essentially no relationship
with peer reporting among workers who were low in organizational commitment. Thus,
Hypothesis 4 was supported.
Hypothesis 5: The Moderating Effects of Commitment to Supervisor.
Hypothesis 5 posited that commitment to the supervisor would moderate the relationship
between supervisors’ encouragement to peer report and peer reporting of CWB-S, such
that this relationship would be stronger when levels of commitment to the supervisor
were high rather than low. Hypothesis 5 was tested using a moderated regression
analysis. For clearer interpretation, I mean-centered each of my predictor variables and
mean-centered them when calculating my interaction terms. In the first step, I regressed
peer reporting of CWB-S onto managerial status, CWB-S observed, and occupational
norms regarding peer reporting. In the second step, I regressed peer reporting of CWB-S
onto supervisors’ encouragement to peer report and affective commitment to the
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supervisor. In the third step, I regressed peer reporting of CWB-S onto the supervisors’
encouragement to peer report x commitment to the supervisor interaction term. The
moderated regression results for the final step are shown in Table 12. CWB-S observed
(β = .59, p < .001) and commitment to the supervisor (β = .16, p < .01) were significant
predictors of peer reporting. The interaction between supervisors’ encouragement and
commitment to the supervisor was not significant (β = .07, p = .08). The final step of the
moderated regression model did not account for significant incremental variance in peer
reporting of CWB-S above and beyond the prior steps, , ∆1- = .01, F(6, 387) = 3.09, p =
.08. Thus, commitment to the supervisor did not moderate the relationship between
supervisors’ encouragement and peer reporting of CWB-S. Hypothesis 5, therefore, was
not supported.
Moderating Effects of Work Group Commitment. Hypothesis 6 posited that
commitment to the workgroup would moderate the relationship between workgroup
norms regarding peer reporting and peer reporting of CWB-W, such that this relationship
was stronger when levels of commitment to the workgroup were high rather than low.
Hypothesis 6 was tested using a moderated regression analysis. For clearer
interpretation, I mean-centered each of my predictor variables and mean-centered them
when calculating my interaction terms. In the first step, I regressed peer reporting of
CWB-W onto managerial status, CWB-W observed, occupational norms regarding peer
reporting, and workgroup discussion of CWBs. In the second step, I regressed peer
reporting of CWB-W onto workgroup norms regarding peer reporting and affective
commitment to the workgroup. In the third step, I regressed peer reporting of CWB-W
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onto the workgroup norms regarding peer reporting x affective commitment to the
workgroup interaction term. The moderated regression results for the final step are
shown in Table 13. CWB-W observed (β = .42, p < .001) and workgroup discussion (β =
.11, p = .04) were significant predictors of peer reporting. Neither workgroup norms (β =
.11, p = .08) nor commitment to the workgroup (β = .03, p = .48) were significant
predictors of peer reporting. The interaction between workgroup norms and commitment
to the workgroup was not significant (β = .03, p = .54). The final step of the moderated
regression model did not account for significant incremental variance in peer reporting
above and beyond the prior steps, 1- = .27, ∆1- = .00, F(6, 365) = 3.09, p = .54. Thus,
commitment to the workgroup does not moderate the relationship between workgroup
norms regarding peer reporting and peer reporting of CWB-W. Hypothesis 6, therefore,
was not supported.
Alternative regression analyses. In addition to the hierarchical regression
analyses conducted to test each hypothesis, I also conducted additional regression
analyses using the proportion of CWBs reported to CWBs observed as the criterion
variable for each model. Prior research, however, has demonstrated that the use of a
proportion as the criterion variable in linear regression analyses is inappropriate (Papke &
Wooldridge, 1996). More specifically, a linear regression with un-transformed
proportions results in the prediction of proportions that are outside the lower bound of
zero and upper bound of one. Researchers should instead consider performing a logit
transformation on the proportions to prevent the issue of predicted values being out of the
bounds of possible values. Thus, I conducted a logit transformation on each of the
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proportions for each regression model. However, to avoid the issue of extreme values
(i.e., proportions of zero and one) being removed from the analyses, I adjusted all
proportions of zero to be equal to .005 and all proportions of one to be equal to .995.
This rounding procedure allowed for all relevant proportions to be included in my
analyses and adequately captured the appropriate variation in my data. The results of
these analyses are displayed in Appendices N through S. Using this alternative
regression analysis based on the proportions of CWBs reported, Hypotheses 2 and 3 were
supported, whereas Hypothesis 4 was not supported.
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IV.

DISCUSSION

Counterproductive work behaviors (CWBs) harm organizations and their
members, but unfortunately they often go undetected by management (Bennett &
Robinson, 2000; Niehoff & Paul, 2000). The purpose of the current study was to
investigate the mechanisms by which the organization, supervisor, and the workgroup
might each encourage employees to report the CWBs they witness—thus aiding in the
detection of CWB. I argued that organizational peer reporting policies, supervisors’
encouragement to peer report, and workgroup norms regarding peer reporting each
created a “strong” peer reporting situation that counteracts witnesses’ general hesitancy
to peer report. However, I found no support for the main effects of policies, supervisors’
encouragement, or workgroup norms on peer reporting. Furthermore, I hypothesized that
commitment to the organization, supervisor, and workgroup would moderate the
respective relationships of organizational policies, supervisors’ encouragement, and
workgroup norms with employees’ peer reporting of CWBs. I found a significant
moderating effect for organizational commitment on the relationship between policies
and peer reporting of CWB-O: Workers who were high in organizational commitment
were more likely to report the CWB-Os they witness than were workers who were low in
organizational commitment. However, I found no significant moderating effects for
either commitment to the supervisor or for commitment to the workgroup. In the next
section I describe the theoretical implications of my findings.
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Theoretical Implications
First, it is important to note that peer reporting is a low base rate behavior. More
specifically, workers tend not to report the CWBs they witness. Current results
demonstrate that only one-fifth to one quarter of CWBs workers observed are reported.
Prior research has demonstrated similar proportions of CWBs reported (see Bowling &
Lyons, 2015; Gruys et al., 2010). Tests of my hypotheses, therefore, may have not
reached statistical significance because of the low base rate of peer reporting behavior.
In other words, my null results could be the result of range restriction caused by peer
reporting’s low base rate.
I did not find significant main effects for organizational peer reporting policies,
supervisors’ encouragement to peer report, or workgroup norms regarding peer reporting
on workers’ peer reporting behavior. It is possible that these variables are insufficient to
overcome workers’ natural hesitancy to engaging in peer reporting (Treviño & Victor,
1992; Victor et al., 1993). The hesitancy to report might originate in childhood
development in which “tattling” on others is neither effective nor encouraged after a
certain age (Cooney, Huthison, & Costigan, 1996; Ingram & Bering, 2010). More
specifically, children tattle on each other (i.e., inform a third party, usually an adult, of
wrongdoing) at an early stage of development, but this stage is immediately followed by
a stage in which negotiation is preferred rather than tattling (Cooney et al., 1996). As
adults, reporting coworkers for misbehaviors in the workplace often creates conflict or
results in retaliation (De Graaf, 2010; King & Hermodson, 2000). Thus, workers might
be hesitant to report because they have been socialized not to report, and they fear
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retaliation from perpetrators, or sometimes, the organization. Also, these constraints on
behavior might weaken the strength of the peer reporting situation. More specifically, the
strength of the peer reporting situation created by organizational, supervisor, and
workgroup behaviors, might not be sufficient to encourage peer reporting because
socialization not to report and fear of retaliation for reporting suppress the strength of the
peer reporting situation.
The current results have implications for the possible mechanisms by which
organizations can facilitate their workers’ peer reporting behavior. Organizational peer
reporting policies do not appear to facilitate workers’ reporting of CWB-Os. It is
possible that when organizational policies are present but the organization fails to adhere
to or “follow-through” with their policies that workers choose not to follow the policies
(Treviño & Weaver, 2001). When organizations fail to follow-through on their ethics
policies, such as peer reporting policies, workers might view this failure as a violation of
expectations regarding procedural and retributive justice. Thus, workers choose not to
report because doing so does not result in action.
Furthermore, it is possible that the mere presence of a policy is not enough.
Rather, it is important that the policy has certain qualities that are conducive to peer
reporting. While the presence of a peer reporting policy might provide clarity as to which
behaviors should be reported or the paths by which workers should report, certain
features of a policy might increase the policy’s strength (Smith-Crowe, Tenbrunsel,
Chan-Serafin, Brief, Umphress, & Joseph, 2015). For example, the 2007 National
Business Ethics Survey (NBES; Ethics Resource Center, 2007) indicated a number of
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policy features (e.g., written standards, training, and ethics hotlines) that were associated
with increased peer reporting. Furthermore, the 2013 edition of the NBES (Ethics
Resource Center, 2013) recommended the implementation of performance evaluations of
ethical conduct, systems to discipline violators, guided ethics values or principles, and
protection from retaliation to improve peer reporting behavior. Thus, the non-significant
relationship between organizational peer reporting policies and peer reporting of CWB-O
in the current study might have been a result of not measuring specific qualities of peer
reporting policies.
To the extent of the author’s knowledge, this is the first peer reporting study to
focus on supervisor behaviors that might encourage subordinates to report the CWBs they
witness. This is a worthwhile focus because supervisor behavior can potentially be
modified via organizational practices (e.g., supervisor training can emphasize behaviors
that encourage subordinate peer reporting). The current results, however, suggest that
supervisors’ encouragement to peer report does not facilitate peer reporting among
subordinates. Prior research has shown that missing the appropriate pathways along
which a worker should report CWBs discourages workers to report (Hor et al., 2010).
Thus, it is possible that encouragement to peer report must be communicated in a manner
that clearly specifies (a) the behaviors to be reported, and (b) the paths by which
reporting should occur.
Also, current results have implications for the effects of the workgroup on the
peer reporting behavior of workgroup members. Workgroup norms regarding peer
reporting do not appear to have a significant effect on the peer reporting of CWBs
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targeted at the workgroup. Prior research both supports and contradicts the current
finding. Most workgroups consist of workers who are of similar tenure and professional
backgrounds. My finding is supported by prior research which has indicated that when
the perpetrator of a misbehavior is perceived as similar to oneself, the witness is less
likely to report that behavior and more likely to mimic that behavior in the future
(Schmidtke, 2007). Thus, when group members are perceived as similar to each other,
they will be less likely to report. My finding, however, conflicts with claims that the
social norm consensus in a group not to report discourages group members to report
(King & Hermodson, 2000). Rather, according to my finding, workgroup norms have
little influence on group members’ peer reporting behavior.
The current findings regarding the significant moderating effect of organizational
commitment on the relationship between peer reporting policies and peer reporting of
CWB-Os have significant theoretical implications. Prior research has demonstrated that
workers high in organizational commitment feel the need to help and give back to the
organization (Meyer & Allen, 1997; Mowday et al., 1979). Prior peer reporting research
has demonstrated that workers high in organizational commitment tend to report more
CWBs—perhaps this represents an attempt to “give back” to the organization (Bowling
& Lyons, 2015). Thus, my findings are consistent with prior research in the
organizational commitment and peer reporting literatures. Furthermore, my findings are
consistent with the principles of reciprocity and social exchange theory (Blau, 1964;
Gouldner, 1960).
I found, however, that organizational policies were not significant predictors of
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peer reporting, but organizational commitment was a strong predictor as was the
interaction between policies and commitment. Workers in organizations without policies
but with high levels of organizational commitment reported significantly fewer CWB-Os
than workers in organizations with policies and with high levels of organizational
commitment. It is possible that workers in organizations without policies but with high
levels of organizational commitment might feel a sense of ambiguity regarding the
actions to be taken when witnessing CWB-Os (Hor et al., 2010). More specifically, they
might want to help the organization, but the ambiguity regarding the appropriate actions
to be taken after witnessing CWBs prevents them from reporting CWBs (i.e., they don’t
want to risk harming the organization). Workers in organizations with policies and with
high levels of organizational commitment, however, (a) may feel that their organization
cares about them, (b) know that certain CWBs should be reported, and (c) trust that their
organization will value the reported information despite the perceived risks (Liu & Wang,
2013). Thus, workers high in organizational commitment likely feel so attached to their
organization that when instructed to report the CWBs they witness, they are far more
likely to do so compared to workers in organizations without policies and to workers with
lower levels of organizational commitment.
As stated previously, the current study is the first to investigate the effects of the
supervisor on subordinates’ peer reporting behavior. The results showed that
commitment to the supervisor does not moderate the relationship between supervisors’
encouragement to report and peer reporting of CWBs targeted at the supervisor. Prior
research has indicated that commitment to the supervisor is positively related to job
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performance (Vandenberghe et al., 2008). Thus, it is possible that if peer reporting was
not a part of a subordinates’ official job duties that they would not report the CWBs they
witness. Alternatively, subordinates might feel uncomfortable reporting CWBs to their
supervisor, especially when the CWBs were directed at their supervisor. Reporting such
information would be particularly uncomfortable if subordinates are high in commitment
to the supervisor. More specifically, workers with high levels of affective commitment to
the supervisor want to help their supervisors. Reporting CWBs directed at their
supervisor, however, might be viewed as detrimental to their supervisor’s well-being by
eliciting negative affective reactions. Therefore, workers high in commitment to the
supervisor might withhold insulting information from their supervisor to protect their
supervisor’s well-being.
Also, workers might not report CWBs directed at their workgroup regardless of
their levels of commitment to the workgroup. Workers might prefer to discuss
misbehavior targeted at the workgroup with other workgroup members rather than
reporting such behavior outside the group. More specifically, workers high in
commitment to the workgroup might not want to violate trust within the group by
reporting CWBs to someone outside the group. As shown in Table 9, discussing CWBs
in the workgroup was a significant predictor of peer reporting, whereas workgroup norms
was not. Thus, workers might prefer to keep such information to the group rather than
potentially causing unintentional, negative consequences for group members, especially
when they are committed to their workgroup (De Graaf, 2010).
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Practical Implications
The current findings have practical implications for organizational settings.
Results showed that organizational policies regarding peer reporting were not
significantly associated with peer reporting of CWB-Os. Organizational commitment,
however, significantly moderated this relationship such that the relationship between
policy presence and peer reporting of CWB-Os was higher for high-commitment workers
than for low-commitment workers. In fact, the highest level of peer reporting of CWBOs occurred when (a) workers were highly committed and (b) a peer reporting policy had
been implemented. Thus, practitioners should first focus on increasing organizational
commitment among workers. The organizational commitment literature provides many
examples of interventions by which organizations can improve workers’ organizational
commitment. Nyhan (1999), for example, found that interpersonal trust is a strong,
positively associated correlate of organizational commitment. Thus, organizations should
engage in trust building from the bottom-up in order to increase organizational
commitment. Regarding peer reporting, more specifically, organizations can ensure
workers that they can trust each other when reporting CWBs. Additionally, Buchanan II
(1974) found that social interaction with organizational peers was a significant predictor
of organizational commitment and therefore suggested that organizations focus on
improving social interactions among peers in the organization in order to increase
organizational commitment.
Future Research
In the current study, I did not measure workers’ consideration of peer reporting as
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either a part of their job description or a behavior that is above and beyond their job
description. Prior research has shown that there are differences between workers in
whether they consider organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs) an official job duty
(i.e., in-role behavior) or going beyond their job duties (i.e., extra-role behavior;
Morrison, 1994). Similarly, future research should investigate whether or not workers
consider peer reporting to be an in-role or extra-role behavior. More specifically, if peer
reporting is a part of the worker’s job performance domain, then they might be more
likely to report because ambiguity around peer reporting might be removed (Hor et al.,
2010). If workers, however, are unfamiliar with their organization’s peer reporting
policy, but their supervisors and workgroups bring this information to the workers’
attention, then perhaps peer reporting will be more likely. Future research is needed to
clarify and provide evidence to support these assumptions.
Also, future research should examine how peer reporting policies affect peer
reporting of CWBs regardless of the target. In the current study, I created three separate
scales to measure peer reporting of CWBs directed at specific targets. Given the low
base rate of peer reporting (see Bowling & Lyons, 2015), however, it might be more
effective to examine the effects of organizational peer reporting polices on the reporting
of CWBs in general. More specifically, combining the scales created in the current study
would allow for a broader range of CWBs that might be witnessed. Prior research by
Bennett and Robinson (2000), for example, has posited that creating CWB measures that
consist of a heterogeneous mix of CWBs allows researchers to capture different CWBs
that might be more common in one organization than another or are context-dependent.
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This practice helps address the low base rate associated with studying narrower forms of
CWB. Thus, future peer reporting research might benefit from scales measuring the
reporting of a broad range of CWBs.
Future research should continue to investigate the effects of supervisors on their
subordinates’ peer reporting behavior. More specifically, rather than asking subordinates
about their peer reporting behavior, researchers should ask supervisors about their
subordinates’ peer reporting behavior. Participants might answer survey items in a
manner that depicts them as more socially desirable than they actually are (Zerbe &
Paulhaus, 1987). Thus, in order to appear more socially desirable, participants might not
be honest in the CWBs they have reported. Gathering the frequency of subordinates’ peer
reporting behavior from their supervisors, however, might eliminate the issue of social
desirability and thus realistically depict the peer reporting behavior of their subordinates.
Finally, future research should investigate how workgroups informally punish
group members for committing CWBs directed at the workgroup. Prior research has
demonstrated that group members will only report the misbehaviors they witness when
the group benefits from the reporting (Miceli & Near, 1985). Current results, however,
showed that workgroup norms regarding peer reporting of CWBs directed at the
workgroup does not predict peer reporting. Thus, simply holding beliefs or norms about
peer reporting is not associated with peer reporting behavior. Rather, workgroups might
resort to informal tactics to punish group members for committing CWBs directed at the
workgroup, especially if the organization does not punish CWBs or is perceived as not
following through with punishment. Future research is needed to provide evidence to
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support these assumptions.
Limitations
There are three important limitations of which to take note in the current study.
First, because I used self-report measures current results might have been affected by
common method variance (CMV). As shown by the many non-significant correlations in
Table 7, it is unlikely that CMV significantly inflated the correlations I observed.
Furthermore, prior research has demonstrated that CMV actually attenuates observed
moderator effects (Evans, 1985). Thus, the significant moderator effect observed for
organizational commitment was found in spite of CMV rather than as the result of CMV.
Although the risks of CMV on results can be significant, future peer reporting research
should continue to use self-report measures to avoid the aforementioned issues associated
with scenario-based studies.
Second, also due to my use of self-report measures current results might have
been affected by a social desirability bias. Social desirability bias refers to participants’
tendency to deny that they have socially undesirable traits or behaviors and to admit to
socially desirable traits or behaviors instead (Zerbe & Paulhaus, 1987). This bias is
problematic in ethics research, including peer reporting research. For example, Randall
and Fernandes (1991) found that self-reported ethical conduct is positively associated
with (a) over-reporting of desirable behaviors and (b) under-reporting of undesirable
behaviors. In the current study, I asked participants about the number of CWBs they
have observed and reported. Thus participants might have responded in a socially
desirable manner by (a) over-reporting the number of CWBs they observed and reported,
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and (b) under-reporting the number of CWBs they observed but did not report.
Third, the current study relied on cross-sectional data rather than longitudinal
data. Cross-sectional data, although convenient, provides weak evidence for causal
inferences. Thus, I cannot make causal inferences from the current results. Future peer
reporting research should collect longitudinal data from organizations.
Conclusion
In the current study, I sought to determine the effects of three different
constituencies—the organization, supervisor, and workgroup–on employees’ peer
reporting of CWBs targeted at the corresponding constituency. I also examined how
commitment to the organization, supervisor, and workgroup further facilitated workers’
peer reporting behavior. My study was the first in the peer reporting literature to examine
the effects of supervisors on peer reporting, which is significant because supervisors
could potentially be trained to behave in ways that encourage peer reporting. However, I
observed no significant main effects and I found that only organizational commitment
produced the hypothesized moderator effect. Given the importance of CWB detection
and prevention, I encourage future research to continue investigating the organizational
variables that might facilitate peer reporting behavior.
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Table 1
Summary of the differences between peer reporting and whistle-blowing
Characteristics

Behavior
Peer Reporting
Whistle-blowing
Organization
Society
Coworker
Organization
Supervisor
External party

Harmed by the misbehavior
Perpetrator of the misbehavior
Party receiving information about
misbehavior
Note. Table constructed from findings by Bowling and Lyons (2015), Curphy et al.
(1998), and Miceli and Near (1984).
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Table 2
Item analysis for supervisors’ encouragement to peer report scale
Item

M

SD

Item-total
correlation (r)

Item-total
correlation if
item dropped (r)
.66
.73

Scale reliability
if item dropped
(α)
.72
.84

1. My supervisor encourages me to report any co-worker misbehavior that I
4.79
1.44
.80
.90
witness.
2. My supervisor prefers that I don’t report the misbehavior of my co-workers. (R)
5.08
1.32
.61
.41
.78
3. My supervisor encourages his or her subordinates to report co-worker
4.90
1.21
.72
.89
.58
.76
.74
.80
misbehavior.
4. My supervisor discourages me from reporting the misbehavior of my co-workers. (R)
5.22
1.19
.60
.43
.77
5. My supervisor encourages me to report the misbehavior of my co-workers.
4.93
1.17
.75
.89
.63
.76
.73
.80
6. If I were to witness co-worker misbehavior, then my supervisor would want me to
5.29
1.30
.68
.51
.76
report it.
Note. All bolded items are items included in the final version of the scale. Bolded values correspond to item analysis results for the final version of the scale. N = 100. α = .78 for original
scale. α = .87 for final version of scale. All missing data were removed before conducting the item analysis. Responses to each item are made on a 7-point graphic rating scale from 1
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). R indicates a reverse-coded item.
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Table 3
Item analysis for workgroup norms regarding peer reporting scale
Item

M

SD

Item-total
correlation (r)

Item-total
correlation if
item dropped
(r)
.75
.80

Scale
reliability if
item dropped
(α)
.87
.92

1. Members of my workgroup encourage me to report any co-worker misbehavior that I
4.37
1.55
.84
.92
witness.
2. Members of my workgroup prefer that I don’t report the misbehavior of my co-workers. (R)
4.35
1.49
.77
.66
.89
3. My workgroup encourages its members to report co-worker misbehavior.
4.41
1.33
.90
.95
.86
.89
.86
.84
4. Members of my workgroup discourage me from reporting the misbehavior of my co-workers.
4.61
1.35
.70
.58
.90
(R)
5. Members of my workgroup encourage me to report the misbehavior of my co-workers.
4.47
1.38
.84
.92
.76
.82
.87
.89
6. If I were to witness co-worker misbehavior, then my workgroup members would want me to
4.66
1.43
.83
.75
.87
report it.
Note. All bolded items are items included in the final version of the scale. Bolded values correspond to item analysis results for the final version of the scale. N = 100. α = .90 for original
scale. α = .92 for final version of scale. All missing data were removed before conducting item analysis. Responses to each item are made on a 7-point graphic rating scale from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). R indicates a reverse-coded item.
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Table 4
Item analysis for occupational norms regarding peer reporting scale
Item

M

SD

Item-total
correlation (r)

Item-total
correlation if
item dropped
(r)
.76
.84
.56
.73
.78
.65
.85
.84
.67

Scale
reliability if
item dropped
(α)
.86
.85
.89
.86
.90
.87
.84
.86
.87

1. The norms of my career field encourage me to report any co-worker misbehavior that I witness.
4.96
1.41
.85
.93
2. People in my career field frown upon the reporting of the misbehavior of one’s coworkers. (R)
4.74
1.59
.72
3. People who work in my career field are encouraged to report co-worker misbehavior.
5.04
1.31
.82
.90
4. People who work in my career field are discouraged from reporting co-worker misbehavior. (R)
5.14
1.26
.75
5. The norms of my career field encourage me to report the misbehavior of my co-workers.
4.84
1.44
.90
.93
6. If I were to witness co-worker misbehavior, then the norms of my career field would encourage me to
5.14
1.45
.78
report it.
Note. All bolded items are items included in the final version of the scale. Bolded values correspond to item analysis results for the final version of the scale. N = 100. α = .89 for original
scale. α = .91 for final version of scale. All missing data were removed before conducting item analysis. Refer to Table X for item content. Responses to each item are made on a 7-point
graphic rating scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). R indicates a reverse-coded item.
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Table 5
Item analysis for workgroup discussion of CWBs scale
Item

M

SD

Item-total
correlation (r)

Item-total
correlation if
item dropped
(r)
.51
.63
.52
.56
.62
.33
.60
.70

Scale
reliability if
item dropped
(α)
.76
.80
.76
.75
.80
.79
.75
.76

1. I often discuss co-worker misbehavior that I’ve witnessed with members of my workgroup.
4.07
1.69
.67
.81
2. I prefer not to discuss the misbehavior of my co-workers with members of my workgroup. (R)
3.76
1.51
.66
3. I am encouraged to discuss co-worker misbehavior with my workgroup.
3.62
1.58
.70
.79
4. I am discouraged from discussing co-worker misbehavior with my workgroup. (R)
4.14
1.60
.52
5. I feel comfortable discussing the misbehavior of my co-workers with members of my
4.12
1.44
.72
.83
workgroup.
6. If I were to witness co-worker misbehavior, then I would discuss it with members of my
4.38
1.51
.78
.82
.67
.67
.73
.78
workgroup.
7. I never discuss co-worker misbehavior that I’ve witnessed with members of my workgroup. (R)
4.20
1.56
.60
.43
.78
Note. All bolded items are items included in the final version of the scale. Bolded values correspond to item analysis results for the final version of the scale. N = 100. α = .79 for original
scale. α = .83 for final version of scale. All missing data were removed before conducting item analysis. Responses to each item are made on a 7-point graphic rating scale from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). R indicates a reverse-coded item.
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Table 6
Correlation matrix between pilot study variables
Variable
M
SD
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1. CWB-O observed
4.49 2.09
–
2. CWB-S observed
3.77 3.10
.67** –
3. CWB-W observed
3.89 2.72
.64** .78**
–
4. Supervisors’
4.87 1.14 -.13 -.14
-.14
(.87)
encouragement
5. Workgroup norms
4.42 1.32 -.02 -.09
-.02
.48** (.92)
6. Occupational norms
4.95 1.28 -.10 -.19
-.15
.37** .48** (.91)
7. Workgroup discussion
4.05 1.26
.13
.12
.03
.04
.24**
.03
(.83)
8. CWB-O reported
1.32 1.66
.44** .30** .38** .00
.19
.08
.14
–
9. CWB-S reported
0.81 1.73
.33** .58** .50** -.06
.12
.02
.08
.42**
–
10. CWB-W reported
1.33 2.13
.33** .43** .53** -.09
.09
.04
.07
.57** .70**
–
Note. N = 100. SD = standard deviation. CWB-O = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the organization. CWB-S =
counterproductive work behavior targeted at the supervisor. CWB-W = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the
workgroup. Two-tailed significance tests are reported. * = p < .05. ** = p < .01. Shaded areas refer to correlations that were
hypothesized as statistically significant. If available, internal-consistency reliabilities are displayed on the diagonal.

78

Table 7
Correlation matrix between primary study variables
Variable
1. Job level
2. CWB-O
observed
3. CWB-S
observed
4. CWB-W
observed
5. Policy
6. Supervisors’
encouragement
7. Workgroup
norms
8. Occupational
norms
9. Workgroup
discussion
10. Organizational
commitment
11. Supervisor
commitment
12. Workgroup
commitment
13. Occupational
commitment
14. CWB-O
reported
15. CWB-S
reported
17. CWB-W
reported

N
501
501

M
1.30
4.69

SD
0.46
2.32

1
–
.13**

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

501

3.81

3.29

.14**

.65**

–

501

3.57

2.90

.13**

.66**

.78**

500
501

2.59
4.94

0.70
1.63

.16**
.10*

.06
.06

.05
.05

.08
.02

–
.47**

(.97)

501

4.57

1.62

.15**

.07

.08

.04

.39**

.76**

(.96)

501

5.10

1.46

.11*

-.01

-.02

-.02

.39**

.65**

.67**

(.96)

497

4.24

1.51

.10*

.14**

.21**

.40**

.48**

.35**

(.91)

501

4.34

1.28

.16**

-.12**

-.08

-.06

.16**

.33**

.30**

.27**

.17**

(.88)

501

4.92

1.31

.08

-.16**

-.20**

-.13**

.16**

.38**

.33**

.28**

.19**

.66**

(.88)

501

4.89

1.40

.11*

-.14**

-.17**

-.14**

.13**

.35**

.28**

.24**

.24**

.71**

.62**

(.92)

501

5.04

1.50

.10*

-.12**

-.19**

-.09*

.10*

.24**

.18**

.23**

.08

.70**

.50**

.61**

(.94)

501

1.16

1.57

.23**

.46**

.45**

.41**

.19**

.30**

.28**

.21**

.33**

.16**

.10*

.10*

.06

–

501

0.85

1.85

.10*

.36**

.58**

.44**

.11*

.17**

.22**

.14**

.20**

.10*

.06

-.01

-.01

.61**

–

501

0.94

1.69

.16**

.35**

.49**

.52**

.16**

.23**

.22**

.17**

.25**

.13**

.04

.01

.06

.62**

.74**

–

11

12

13

14

15

16

–

.20**

–
–

.17**

–

–

Note. Missing data removed pairwise. SD = standard deviation. CWB-O = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the
organization. CWB-S = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the supervisor. CWB-W = counterproductive work
behavior targeted at the workgroup. Two-tailed significance tests are reported. * = p < .05. ** = p < .01. If available,
internal-consistency reliabilities are displayed on the diagonal.
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Table 8
Hierarchical regression results for H1
CWB-O reported
SE
.15
.04
.05
.20

Variables
Model
β
Job level
.14**
CWB-O observed
.44**
Occupational norms
.16**
Policy
.05
"
.27
!
"
.26
Adjusted !
F
.96
.00
∆!" for the last step
Note. CWB-O = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the organization. SE =
standard error. N = 408. Participants who did not know if their organizations had a peer
reporting policy, and participants who have never observed CWB-Os in their
organizations were removed. Standardized regression coefficients are from the last step
in the hierarchical regression model. Two-tailed significance tests are reported. * = p <
.05. ** = p < .01.
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Table 9
Hierarchical regression results for H2
Variables

β
.01
.56**
.10
.11

CWB-S reported
SE
.18
.03
.08
.07

Model

Job level
CWB-S observed
Occupational norms
Supervisors’ encouragement
.36
!"
"
.35
Adjusted !
F
3.73
.01
∆!" for the last step
Note. CWB-S = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the supervisor. SE =
standard error. N = 393. Participants who have never observed CWBs targeted at their
supervisors were removed. Standardized regression coefficients are from the last step in
the hierarchical regression model. Two-tailed significance tests are reported. * = p < .05.
** = p < .01.
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Table 10
Hierarchical regression results for H3
CWB-W reported
SE
.18
.04
.08
.06

Variables
Model
β
Job level
.05
CWB-W observed
.41**
Occupational norms
.09
Workgroup
.11*
discussion
Workgroup norms
.12
.07
.26
!"
"
.25
Adjusted !
F
3.45
.01
∆!" for the last step
Note. CWB-W = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the workgroup. SE =
standard error. N = 372. Participants who have never observed CWBs targeted at their
workgroups were removed. Standardized regression coefficients are from the last step in
the hierarchical regression model. Two-tailed significance tests are reported. * = p < .05.
** = p < .01.
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Table 11
Moderated regression results for H4
Variables

β
.12**
.46**
.12**
.06
.18**
.10*

CWB-O reported
SE
.15
.04
.05
.20
.06
.13

Model

Job level
CWB-O observed
Occupational norms
Policy
Organizational commitment
Policy * Organizational
commitment
.31*
!"
"
.30
Adjusted !
F
4.89*
.01*
∆!" for the last step
Note. CWB-O = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the organization. SE =
standard error. N = 408. Participants who did not know if their organizations had a peer
reporting policy, and participants who have never observed CWB-Os in their
organizations were removed. Standardized regression coefficients are from the last step
in the moderated regression model. Two-tailed significance tests are reported. * = p <
.05. ** = p < .01.
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Table 12
Moderated regression results for H5
CWB-S reported
Variables
SE
Model
β
Job level
.00
.18
CWB-S observed
.59**
.03
Occupational norms
.08
.08
Supervisors’ encouragement
.08
.07
Supervisor commitment
.16**
.07
Supervisors’ encouragement * Supervisor commitment
.07
.03
.38
!"
"
.37
Adjusted !
F
3.09
.01
∆!" for the last step
Note. CWB-S = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the supervisor. SE =
standard error. N = 393. Participants who have never observed CWBs targeted at their
supervisors were removed. Standardized regression coefficients are from the last step in
the moderated regression model. Two-tailed significance tests are reported. * = p < .05.
** = p < .01.
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Table 13
Moderated regression results for H6
CWB-W reported
SE
β
.05
.18
.42**
.04
.09
.08
.11*
.07
.11
.08
.03
.07
.03
.04

Variables

Model

Job level
CWB-W observed
Occupational norms
Workgroup discussion
Workgroup norms
Workgroup commitment
Workgroup norms * Workgroup
commitment
.27
!"
"
.25
Adjusted !
F
.37
"
.00
∆! for the last step
Note. CWB-W = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the workgroup. SE =
standard error. N = 372. Participants who have never observed CWBs targeted at their
workgroups were removed. Standardized regression coefficients are from the last step in
the moderated regression model. Two-tailed significance tests are reported. * = p < .05.
** = p < .01.

85

1.4

CWB-O Reported

1.2
1

Low
organizational
commitment
High
organizational
commitment

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
No Policy

Policy

Figure 1. Interaction of organizational policy regarding peer reporting and organizational
commitment on peer reporting of counterproductive work behaviors targeted at the
organization (CWB-O). N = 408. Slope was greater for the higher organizational
commitment group (β = 1.10) than the lower organizational commitment group (β = –
.09). Participants who (a) did not know if their organizations had a peer reporting policy,
and (b) participants who have never observed CWB-Os in their organizations were
removed.
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Appendix A
Pilot Study Cover Letter
DATE
Dear Participant:
You are being invited to participate in a research study by completing a survey conducted by
graduate student Joseph Dagosta and Professor of Psychology Dr. Nathan Bowling about the
reporting of deviant behavior in the workplace to an individual in a position of authority. There
are no known risks for your participation in this research study. The information collected may
not benefit you directly. The information learned in this study may be helpful to others. The
information you provide will help us understand how organizations can encourage employees to
report deviant behavior. Your completed survey will be stored securely online.
The survey will take approximately one hour to complete. You will be compensated with one
credit for each 30 minutes of participation. Credit is pro-rated for those who withdraw from the
study before it is completed. Please complete the entire survey in one sitting. You will NOT be
able to partially complete the survey and return to it at a later time. Please be sure you have
available the allotted amount of time before beginning the survey. You will have a maximum
of 60 minutes to complete the survey.
Individuals from the Department of Psychology, the Institutional Review Board (IRB), Office of
Research and Sponsored Programs and other regulatory agencies may inspect these records. In
all other respects, however, the data will be held in confidence to the extent permitted by law.
Should the data be published, your identity will not be disclosed.
Taking part in this study is voluntary. By completing this survey, you agree to take part in this
research study. You do not have to answer any questions that make you uncomfortable. You
may choose not to take part at all. If you decide to be in this study you may stop taking part at any
time. If you decide not to be in this study or if you stop taking part at any time, you will not lose
any benefits for which you may qualify.
If you have any questions, concerns, or complaints about the research study, please contact:
Joseph Dagosta (email: dagosta.2@wright.edu) or his faculty advisor Dr. Nathan Bowling (email:
nathan.bowling@wright.edu). If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject,
you may call the Wright State IRB Office at (937) 775-4462. You can discuss any questions
about your rights as a research subject with a member of the IRB or staff. The IRB is an
independent committee made up of people from the University community, staff of the
institutions, as well as people from the community not connected with these institutions. The IRB
has reviewed this research study.
Sincerely,
Joseph Dagosta
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Appendix B
Supervisors’ encouragement to peer report scale items
1. My supervisor encourages me to report any co-worker misbehavior that I witness.
2. My supervisor prefers that I don’t report the misbehavior of my co-workers.
3. My supervisor encourages his or her subordinates to report co-worker
misbehavior.
4. My supervisor discourages me from reporting the misbehavior of my co-workers.
5. My supervisor encourages me to report the misbehavior of my co-workers.
6. If I were to witness co-worker misbehavior, then my supervisor would want me to
report it.
Note. Responses to each item are made on a 7-point graphic rating scale from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). R indicates a reverse-coded item. Items in bold are items
that were kept after item analyses and included on the final version of the scale used in
the primary study.
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Appendix C
Workgroup norms regarding peer reporting scale items
1. Members of my workgroup encourage me to report any co-worker misbehavior
that I witness.
2. Members of my workgroup prefer that I don’t report the misbehavior of my coworkers.
3. My workgroup encourages its members to report co-worker misbehavior.
4. Members of my workgroup discourage me from reporting the misbehavior of my coworkers.
5. Members of my workgroup encourage me to report the misbehavior of my coworkers.
6. If I were to witness co-worker misbehavior, then my workgroup members would want
me to report it.
Note. Responses to each item are made on a 7-point graphic rating scale from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). R indicates a reverse-coded item. Items in bold are items
that were kept after item analyses and included on the final version of the scale used in
the primary study.
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Appendix D
Occupational norms regarding peer reporting scale items
1. The norms of my career field encourage me to report any co-worker misbehavior
that I witness.
2. People in my career field prefer that I don’t report the misbehavior of my co-workers.
3. People who work in my career field are encouraged to report co-worker
misbehavior.
4. People who work in my career field are discouraged from reporting co-worker
misbehavior.
5. The norms of my career field encourage me to report the misbehavior of my coworkers.
6. If I were to witness co-worker misbehavior, then the norms of my career field would
encourage me to report it.
Note. Responses to each item are made on a 7-point graphic rating scale from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). R indicates a reverse-coded item. Items in bold are items
that were kept after item analyses and included on the final version of the scale used in
the primary study.
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Appendix E
CWB witness discussion in workgroup scale items
1. I often discuss co-worker misbehavior that I’ve witnessed with members of my
workgroup.
2. I prefer not to discuss the misbehavior of my co-workers with members of my
workgroup. (R)
3. I am encouraged to discuss co-worker misbehavior with my workgroup.
4. I am discouraged from discussing co-worker misbehavior with my workgroup. (R)
5. I feel comfortable discussing the misbehavior of my co-workers with members of
my workgroup.
6. If I were to witness co-worker misbehavior, then I would discuss it with members
of my workgroup.
7. I never discuss co-worker misbehavior that I’ve witnessed with members of my
workgroup. (R)
Note. Responses to each item are made on a 7-point graphic rating scale from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). R indicates a reverse-coded item. Items in bold are items
that were kept after item analyses and included on the final version of the scale used in
the primary study.
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Appendix F
Bowling and Lyons’s (2015) adapted peer reporting of CWB-Os scale items
1. A co-worker littered the work environment.
2. A co-worker came in late to work without permission.
3. A co-worker took an additional or longer break than is acceptable at your workplace.
4. A co-worker consumed alcohol on the job.
5. A co-worker spent too much time fantasizing or daydreaming instead of working.
6. A co-worker took property from work without permission.
7. A co-worker put little effort into his/her work.
8. A co-worker intentionally worked slower than he/she could have worked.
Note. There are three possible responses to each item: “I have NOT witnessed this
behavior in my workplace,” “I have witnessed this behavior in my workplace, but I did
NOT report it,” and “I have witnessed this behavior in my workplace, and I did report it.”
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Appendix G
Bowling and Lyons’s (2015) peer reporting of CWBs directed at workgroup scale items
1. A co-worker publicly embarrassed someone in my workgroup.
2. A co-worker made an ethnic, religious, or racial remark about someone in my
workgroup.
3. A co-worker acted rudely toward someone in my workgroup.
4. A co-worker cursed at someone in my workgroup.
5. A co-worker said something hurtful to someone in my workgroup.
6. A co-worker made fun of someone in my workgroup.
7. A co-worker played a mean prank on someone in my workgroup.
8. A co-worker neglected to follow their workgroup’s instructions.
Note. There are three possible responses to each item: “I have NOT witnessed this
behavior in my workplace,” “I have witnessed this behavior in my workplace, but I did
NOT report it,” and “I have witnessed this behavior in my workplace, and I did report it.”
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Appendix H
Mitchell & Ambrose’s (2007) adapted supervisor-directed CWBs scale items
1. A co-worker made fun of my supervisor at work.
2. A co-worker played a mean prank on my supervisor.
3. A co-worker made an obscene comment or gesture toward my supervisor.
4. A co-worker acted rudely toward my supervisor.
5. A co-worker gossiped about my supervisor.
6. A co-worker made an ethnic, religious, or racial remark against my supervisor.
7. A co-worker publicly embarrassed my supervisor.
8. A co-worker swore at my supervisor.
9. A co-worker refused to talk to my supervisor.
10. A co-worker said something hurtful to my supervisor at work.
Note. There are three possible responses to each item: “I have NOT witnessed this
behavior in my workplace,” “I have witnessed this behavior in my workplace, but I did
NOT report it,” and “I have witnessed this behavior in my workplace, and I did report it.”
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Appendix I
Meyer and Allen’s (1991) affective organizational commitment scale items
1. I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career in this organization
2. I enjoy discussing my organization with people outside it.
3. I really feel as if this organization’s problems are my own.
4. I think I could easily become as attached to another organization as I am to this one.
(R)
5. I do not feel like “part of the family” at my organization. (R)
6. I do not feel “emotionally attached” to this organization. (R)
7. This organization has a great deal of personal meaning for me.
8. I do not feel a strong sense of belonging to my organization. (R)
Note. Responses to each item are made on a 7-point graphic rating scale from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). R indicates a reverse-coded item.
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Appendix J
Stinglhamber et al.’s (2002) affective commitment to the supervisor scale
1. I have respect for my supervisor.
2. I appreciate my supervisor.
3. I have little admiration for my supervisor. (R)
4. I feel proud to work with my supervisor.
5. My supervisor means a lot to me.
6. I do not feel attached to my supervisor. (R)
Note. Responses to each item are made on a 7-point graphic rating scale from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). R indicates a reverse-coded item.
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Appendix K
Stinglhamber et al.’s (2002) affective commitment to the workgroup scale
1. My workgroup means a lot to me.
2. I really feel a sense of belonging to my workgroup.
3. I feel proud to be a member of my workgroup.
4. I do not feel a strong sense of belonging to my workgroup. (R)
5. I do not feel like part of the family in my workgroup. (R)
6. I do not feel emotionally attached to my workgroup. (R)
Note. Responses to each item are made on a 7-point graphic rating scale from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). R indicates a reverse-coded item.
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Appendix L
Stinglhamber et al.’s (2002) affective occupational commitment scale
1. My occupation means a lot to me.
2. I am proud of the occupation that I practice.
3. I am enthusiastic about my occupation.
4. I do not feel emotionally attached to my occupation. (R)
5. I do not feel a strong sense of belonging to my occupation. (R)
6. I do not identify myself with my occupation. (R)
Note. Responses to each item are made on a 7-point graphic rating scale from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). R indicates a reverse-coded item.

98

Appendix M
Primary Study Cover Letter
The Influence of the Organization, Supervisor, and Workgroup on Peer Reporting of
CWBs
DATE
Dear Participant:
You are being invited to participate in a research study by completing a survey about conducted
by graduate student Joseph Dagosta and Professor of Psychology Nathan Bowling about the
influence of the organization and its constituencies on workers’ report of deviant behavior in the
workplace. There are no known risks for your participation in this research. The information
collected may not benefit you directly. The information learned in this study may be helpful to
others. The information you provide will help us understand how organizations can encourage
employees to report the deviant behavior they witness. Your completed survey will be stored
securely online.
The survey will take approximately 60 minutes to complete. You will be compensated with
$0.50 for completing the survey. Please complete the entire survey in one sitting. You will
NOT be able to partially complete the survey and return to it at a later time. Please be sure you
have available the allotted amount of time before beginning the survey. You will have a
maximum of 60 minutes to complete the survey.
Individuals from the Department of Psychology, the Institutional Review Board (IRB), Office of
Research and Sponsored Programs and other regulatory agencies may inspect these records. In
all other respects, however, the data will be held in confidence to the extent permitted by law.
Should the data be published, your identity will not be disclosed.
Taking part in this study is voluntary. By completing this survey, you agree to take part in this
research study. You do not have to answer any questions that make you uncomfortable. You
may choose not to take part at all. If you decide to be in this study you may stop taking part at any
time. If you decide not to be in this study or if you stop taking part at any time, you will not lose
any benefits for which you may qualify.
If you have any questions, concerns, or complaints about the research study, please contact:
Joseph Dagosta (email: dagosta.2@wright.edu) or his faculty advisor Dr. Nathan Bowling (email:
nathan.bowling@wright.edu). If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject,
you may call the Wright State IRB Office at (937) 775-4462. You can discuss any questions
about your rights as a research subject with a member of the IRB or staff. The IRB is an
independent committee made up of people from the University community, staff of the
institutions, as well as people from the community not connected with these institutions. The IRB
has reviewed this research study.
Sincerely,
Joseph Dagosta
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Appendix N
Ratio of reported to observed CWB-O hierarchical regression results for H1
CWB-O reported
SE
.30
.11
.40

Variables
Model
β
Job level
.16**
Occupational norms
.14**
Policy
.04
.06
!"
"
.05
Adjusted !
F
13.45
.00
∆!" for the last step
Note. CWB-O = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the organization. SE =
standard error. N = 408. Participants who did not know if their organizations had a peer
reporting policy, and participants who have never observed CWB-Os in their
organizations were removed. Standardized regression coefficients are from the last step
in the hierarchical regression model. Two-tailed significance tests are reported. * = p <
.05. ** = p < .01.
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Appendix O
Ratio of reported to observed CWB-S hierarchical regression results for H2
Variables

β
.10
.04
.16*

CWB-S reported
SE
.30
.13
.12

Model

Job level
Occupational norms
Supervisors’ encouragement
.05*
!"
"
.04
Adjusted !
F
13.33*
.01*
∆!" for the last step
Note. CWB-S = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the supervisor. SE =
standard error. N = 393. Participants who have never observed CWBs targeted at their
supervisors were removed. Standardized regression coefficients are from the last step in
the hierarchical regression model. Two-tailed significance tests are reported. * = p < .05.
** = p < .01.
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Appendix P
Ratio of reported to observed CWB-W hierarchical regression results for H3
CWB-W reported
SE
.36
.15
.13

Variables
Model
β
Job level
.13*
Occupational norms
.06
Workgroup
.11*
discussion
Workgroup norms
.17*
.15
"
.11*
!
"
.10
Adjusted !
F
19.32*
.01*
∆!" for the last step
Note. CWB-W = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the workgroup. SE =
standard error. N = 372. Participants who have never observed CWBs targeted at their
workgroups were removed. Standardized regression coefficients are from the last step in
the hierarchical regression model. Two-tailed significance tests are reported. * = p < .05.
** = p < .01.
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Appendix Q
Ratio of reported to observed CWB-O moderated regression results for H4
Variables

β
.14**
.10
.05
.20**
.06

CWB-O reported
SE
.30
.11
.41
.11
.28

Model

Job level
Occupational norms
Policy
Organizational commitment
Policy * Organizational
commitment
.10
!"
"
.09
Adjusted !
F
22.20
.00
∆!" for the last step
Note. CWB-O = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the organization. SE =
standard error. N = 408. Participants who did not know if their organizations had a peer
reporting policy, and participants who have never observed CWB-Os in their
organizations were removed. Standardized regression coefficients are from the last step
in the moderated regression model. Two-tailed significance tests are reported. * = p <
.05. ** = p < .01.
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Appendix R
Ratio of reported to observed CWB-S moderated regression results for H5
CWB-S reported
Variables
SE
Model
β
Job level
.10
.30
Occupational norms
.04
.13
Supervisors’ encouragement
.15*
.12
Supervisor commitment
.07
.12
Supervisors’ encouragement * Supervisor commitment
.05
.06
"
.06
!
"
.04
Adjusted !
F
11.80
"
.00
∆! for the last step
Note. CWB-S = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the supervisor. SE =
standard error. N = 393. Participants who have never observed CWBs targeted at their
supervisors were removed. Standardized regression coefficients are from the last step in
the moderated regression model. Two-tailed significance tests are reported. * = p < .05.
** = p < .01.
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Appendix S
Ratio of reported to observed CWB-W moderated regression results for H6
Variables

β
.13*
.06
.12*
.17*
.01
.08

CWB-W reported
SE
.36
.16
.13
.15
.13
.07

Model

Job level
Occupational norms
Workgroup discussion
Workgroup norms
Workgroup commitment
Workgroup norms * Workgroup
commitment
.12
!"
.11
Adjusted !"
F
18.98
.01
∆!" for the last step
Note. CWB-W = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the workgroup. SE =
standard error. N = 372. Participants who have never observed CWBs targeted at their
workgroups were removed. Standardized regression coefficients are from the last step in
the moderated regression model. Two-tailed significance tests are reported. * = p < .05.
** = p < .01.
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